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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
Over t h e  aast years ,  t he re  has been an interest  i n  t h e  development 
Several  a i r c r a f t  of f u t u r e  a i r c r a f t  fueled with l i q u i d  hydrogen (LH2). 
manufacturers have performed design s t u d i e s  on LHZ-fueled a i rp lanes .  
NASA was in t e re s t ed  i n  ideh t i fy ing  any technological  gaps which might 
need follow-on work a f t e r  a comparison and s a f e t y  assessment was made. 
The f u e l s  f o r  comparison with LH2 were spec i f ied  t o  be l i q u i d  methane 
(LCHI!), .Jet A, JP-4 and gasol ine.  
f u t u r e  dec is ion  t o  bui ld  a LHg-fueled a l r c r a f t ,  is t h e  r e l a t i v e  c rash  
f i r e  hazards assoc ia ted  with LH2 f u e l .  
An important quest ion,  c r u c i a l  ta any 
Consequently, NASA issued  a request  f o r  proposals  on "An assessment 
of t he  Crash Fire Hazard of  Liquid Hydrogen Fueled Aircraf t . ' '  
posals  were accepted by NASA. The Arthur D. L i t t l e ,  Inc. work is described 
i n  t h i s  repor t ;  t he  p a r a l l e l  work done f o r  NASA by the  Lockheed Corporation 
is t h e  sub jec t  of a separa te  repor t .  The two p ro jec t s  were done indepen- 
dent ly  although Arthur D. Li t t le ,  Inc. used Lockheed designs f o r  fu tu re  
LH2 and LCH4 fueled a i r c r a f t  as a b a s i s  f o r  t h e  evaluat ion.  
was based on the  l a r g e  amount of design work already done and published 
by Lockheed on these  concepts. 
Two pro- 
This choice 
1.2 SCOTE OF WORK -
The propram consis ted of t h ree  tasks  i n  addi t ion  t o  a repor t ing  task.  
Task I, State-of-the-Art Review. 
To c o l l e c t  and eva lua te  da t a  r e l a t i n g  to  the  hazardous p rope r t i e s  
of l i q u i d  hydrogen i n  comparison t o  those of LCH 
and gasol ine.  
Jet A,  JP-4, 4' 
1 
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0 To review crash fire data from Jet A, JP-4 and gasoline 
aircraft accidents. 
0 To review recent studies and proposals for liquid hydrogen 
fueled aircraft by major aircraft manufacturers. 
Task 11. Crash Scenario Evaluation and Modeling 
0 To evaluate four general crash scenarios: 
1) A nonnormal landing or ground accident which results in 
fuel system insulation damage and/or fuel system damage 
permitting liquid hydrogen to vent, escape, leak or run 
out of a punctured tank or broken line. 
2) A survivable "crash" landing or failed "takeoff" where 
damage to fuel tankage or linea results in a massive 
release of liquid hydrogen after the aircraft has come 
to rest. 
3)  A survivable "crash" landing or failed "takeoff" where 
damage to fuel tankage or lines results in a massive 
release of liquid hydrogen upon impact and during aircraft 
deceleration. 
4) A catastrophic crash resulting in the maximum rate of 
energy release in the form of a conflagration and/or 
explosion. 
0 To determine the theoretical characteristics or mdels of these 
scenarios with liquid hydrogen, in comparison with liquefied 
natural gas and methane, and conventional hydrocarbon fuels (such 
as Jet A and JP-4). The comparative hazards of each fuel evaluated 
shall be determined. The effect of fuel tank location and ignition 
sources and other relevant parameters associated with cryogenically 
fueled aircraft designs recently proposed by major aircraft 
manufacturers shall be incorporated into this study. 
2 
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Task 111. Comprehensive Review and Anklysis 
0 To present analytical models applicable to the various fire 
scenarios and compare the relative crash fire effects for all 
the fuels. 
0 To identify technological gaps and specific unknowns and 
uncertainties that limit the depth of this study. 
e To suggest areas for follow-on research and experiments to 
provide technology and data supplemental to this study and 
applicable to the design and development of liquid hydrogen 
fueled aircra€t. 
1.3 GENEPAL APPROACH 
To meet the objectives of this study, we conducted an extensive 
evaluation of available information on past crash fire accident descrip- 
tions as well as on the potential designs available for cryogenic and 
conventional fueled aircraft. After selecting a set of designs based 
on equivalent passenger capacity and range for our comparative analysis, 
we evaluated a broad range of potential hazards associated with realistic 
types of crash damage. 
Statement of Work were used to categorize crash events in general terms. 
Rates and quantities of fuel release were identified for the LH2, LCH4 
arid conventional fueled aircraft. 
The four scenarios given to us by NASA in the 
Next, we reviewed available hazard mode,s for describing potential 
con;equences of such releases for the various fuels and crash scenarios. 
At this point, we identified thi. most significant hazards and concentrated 
our efforts in a comparative analysis of the consequences expected for the 
various fuels. Finally, we performed a c3mparative evaluation and 
identified some areas where additional work appears to be needed prior 
to an active decision to proceed with a LH2-fueled aircraft. 
3 
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In t h i s  r epor t ,  t h e  state-of-the-art  t a sk  r e s u l t s  are d i s t r i b u t e d  
by subjected matter i n  the  appropriate  sec t ions .  
ava i l ab le  design concepts f o r  LH2 fueled and comparable LCH4 and conven- 
t i o n z l  f u e l  a i r c r a f t  and discusses  our r a t i o n a l e  f o r  s e l e c t i n g  the  designs 
on which our comparative evaluat ion is based. 
eva lua tes  ava i lab le  h i s t o r i c a l  crash f i r e  data .  These da ta ,  f o r  the  
se l ec t ed  a i r c r a f t  configurat ions,  are u t i l i z e d  i n  Sect ion 4 t o  cha rcc t e r i ze  
accident  scenarios .  I n  Section 5 ,  we d iscuss  poss ib le  hazards and i d e n t i f y  
the  more s i g n i f i c a s t  hazards f o r  comparative analyses.  
Section 2 descr ibes  
Sect ion 3 presents  and 
The ana lys is  and comparison of hazards due t o  f i r e b a l l  formation are 
presented i n  Section 6; y o 1  f i r e  hazards are evaluated i n  Section 7. 
Sect ion 8 summarizes the  main r e s u l t s  of the  comparative evaluat ion and 
presents  recommendations f o r  fu tu re  work. 
analyses  a r e  presented i n  Appendices A t o  C. 
Supporting information and 
1.4 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
I n  t h i s  study, w e  compared crash f i r e  hazards of mission equivalent ,  
400 passenger, Mach 0 . 8 5 ,  5500 n. m i l e  range a i r c r a f t  f o r  th ree  types of 
f u e l ,  These f u e l s  were l i q u i d  hydrogen, l i q u i d  methane, and conventional 
j e t  fue l .  
fuselage; the conventiozal f u e l  a i r c r a f t  had wing f u e l  tanka. 
designs were based on published Lockheed s tudies .  
The two cryogenic-fueled designs had tanks located i n  the  
A l l  t h e  
For purposes of comparison, w e  considered four crash scenarios  rang- 
ing  from minor releases t o  a ca tas t rophic  crash.  
p o t e n t i a l  fuel-release and crash f i r e  consequences were compared f o r  t he  
th ree  types o t  fue l s .  
I n  each scenario,  t h e  
Our basic conclusion is  t h a t  t he  c?raRh tire hazards are not  s igni-  
f i c a n t l y  d i f f e r e n t  when compared i n  general  f o r  t h e  th ree  fue l s ,  al though 
some f u e l s  showed mino? idvantages i n  one respect  o r  another. 
f i c a l l y  : 
Speci- 
4 
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0 For f i r e b a l l  post  crash scenarios, LE2 showed r e l a t i v e l y  lower 
hazard zones a t  grade than d id  conventional f u e l s  and La4 ( in  
t ha t  order) .  This e f f e c t  is apparent whether t he  comparison 
is made on the  bas i s  of t o t a l  f u e l  volume released o r  on the  
bas i s  of equivalent chemical energy content of t he  f u e l  re- 
leased. This is due to the  rapid burning of t he  hydrogen, 
the  smaller f i r e b a l l  s i z e ,  and the  lower emissivi ty  of t he  
hydrogen flame. 
0 For f u e l  releases re su l t i ng  i n  pool f i r e s ,  LE2 also prc4uces 
smaller hazard zones than the  o ther  fue l s ,  on e i t h e r  a volume 
or energy content comparative bas i s  except f o r  t he  l a r g e s t  
s p i l l  s i z e s  where the  hazard zone may be s l i g h t l y  higher than 
that f o r  conventional f u e l  - but still subs t an t i a l ly  less 
than that f o r  LCH4. 
quickly, has a smaller diameter (although taller) flame and 
a lesser emissive power except a t  very l a r g e  s p i l l  s izes .  
Again, t he  IA2 f i r e  bums out  very 
0 Dispersing aerosol  is po ten t i a l ly  a problem f o r  a l l  th ree  
fue ls .  
i t  is so dependent on '-he spec i f i c s  of p a r t i c u l a r  crash con- 
d i t i ons .  
Aerosol formation was not t rea ted  comparatively because 
0 For the  two cryogenic fue l s ,  downwind dispers ion of vapors 
from unignited f u e l  s p i l l s i s  a po ten t i a l  problem. 
expect LCH4 t o  be more l i k e l y  t o  d isperse  damwind near grade; 
LE4 might be more l i k e l p  to  rise. 
mation, both d ispers ing  clouds could remain near grade. 
One might 
However, with aerosol  for- 
0 Because of the  wider flammability limits, more f u e l  I s  l i ko ly  
t o  be flammable a t  any time i n  a dispers ing LE 
t han  i n  an equivalent La4 vapor cloud. Hewever, t h i s  in- 
creases  the  c h n c e  of earlier ign i t ion  i n  a dispers ing LE2 
cloud and may reduce the  extent  of downwind vapor f i r e  damage. 
vapor cloud 2 
5 
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0 Smeller spills of Lli, and LCB4 are likely to disperse as 
neutrally buoyant plumes. 
L 
0 Considerable uncertainty esists in prediction of downwind 
dispersion distances for large m; spills because of 
limited experlarental data and the complexity of the physical 
effects involved in developing a theoretical model. 
less data are available for Lliz spills. 
In severe crashes, fire is so likely that theoretical flam- 
mable vapor dispersion vith delayed ignition is not con- 
sidered a credible threat at large distances from the crash. 
Far 
0 
0 Lli is more likely to cause blast effects due to accumulation 2 
and i-ition in confined spaces. 
mized by careful design, monitoring, provision of inerting 
systems, and design with secondary barriers to contain small 
leaks. 
This problem can be mini- 
In s\mepary, out comparative evaluation for historically observed 
crash damage scenarios applied to mission equivalent aircraft shows that 
Lli2 offers survivability benefits in amst cases where a fire occurs 
rapidly. 
relatively minor and difficult to quantify. 
hazard standpoint. LH2 does not appear to be a significantly more 
hazardous fuel than conventional jet fuels and LCH4. 
it offers lesser hazards. 
velopment work, we see no crash fire hazard situations which should 
discourage development of a U2-fueled aircraft. 
These advantages and disadvantages in other respects are 
However, from a crash fire 
In some respects, 
Thus, pending some future research and de- 
From our evaluation, we recommend that additional safety studies be 
perfowed to clarify some of the remaining mcertainties relating to 
LH2 hazards. In particular: 
6 
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Additional dispersion and fire tests would be desirable to 
confirm the conclusions drawn In this study, which are 
based on the current state-of-the-art. For example, pool 
fire tests with an instrumented fuselage can be conducted 
to test the validity of our predictions in Section 7. 
Comparisons between future LH2 tests and planned LCH4 (LNG) 
tests, under DOE sponsorship at Jackass Flats, Nevada, should 
be made. 
Second generation fire and dispersion models should be de- 
veloped, based on theory and results of experiments. 
Further, should the development of a LH aircraft proceed, some 2 
technological improvements should be given priority; for example: 
0 Further studies to develop optimum design and systems for 
LH aircraft are needed. Crashworthiness should be an 
important coiiaideration in design. 
2 
0 Since component reliability is very important in preventing 
minor leaks with potential for creating a serious incident 
or accident in a LHz aircraft, attention should be focussed 
on further development work on the foilowing components: 
- Less expensive pumps ($5,000 range) 
- Improved pump seals with a longer operating life 
(present seals are designed for only a few hours 
of operation) 
- Evaluation of new types of fuel transfer systems 
to minimize the change of any leakage (pump seals, 
valve packings, etc.) 
- Improved lightweight and strong storage systems 
- Optimized LH2 combustors 
7 
Arthur D ljttlolnc 
2. AIRCRAFT SYSTEM SELECTION 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The assessment of the crash fire hazard of LH2-fueled, subsonic, 
commercial aircraft requires the use of aircraft concepts which represent 
the most probable missions and configuration of this post 
transportation system. 
exist, the crash hazard analysis must be based upon preliminary designs 
of practical commercial :rcraft using this fuel. The purpose of this 
section is to identify, from published information, the most viable con- 
cept for the liquid hydrogen-fueled aircraft and a concept for "comparable" 
LCH and conventional fuel aircraft.* 4 
In the following paragraphs, first we review briefly the information 
1990-1995 
Because no liquid hydrogen fueled aircraft 
available in the literature on various LH2 aircraft concepts. 
we define the anticipated mission of a LH2 aircraft. 
three aircraft designs having the same mission but fueled by LH2, LCH4 
and conventional fuel. 
Secondly, 
Thirdly, we select 
2.2 REVIEW OF DATA ON LH, AIRCRAFT CONCEPTS 
In the 1970's the major U.S. commercial aircraft manufacturers gave 
L 
serious consideration to alternate aircraft fuels with particular interest 
centerjng on liquid hydrogen. 
none, but the most general results, are available in open literature. 
Beginning in 1973, however, NASAILangley sponsored a series of studies 
on liquid hydrogen fueled subsonic commercial aircraft which dealt with 
the following major topics: 
Much of this work was self-sponsored and 
(2.1, 2.2)f 1. 
2. LH2 Aircraft Fuel System 
3. LH2 Aircraft Airport Requirements 
4. 
LH2 Aircraft and Comparison JAF Aircraft 
(2.3) 
(2.4, 2.5) 
LCH4 Aircraft and Comparison LH2 and JAF Aircraft (2.6) 
*In this section, we do not distinguish between the conventional fuels 
(JP-4, gasoline, kerosine and Jet A) since their corresponding fuel 
systems are essentially similar. 
fNumbers in brackets denote refereneee which are presented in Section 9 .  
8 
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Lockheed performed each of  these  s t u d i e s  and Boeing only the  t h i r d  
Together they are the  d e f i n i t i v e  s tudy,  dupl ica t ing  the  Lockheed work. 
d a t a  source on t h e  LH2. JAF and LCH4 fueled subsonic a i r c r a f t .  
and McDonnell D o u g l a ~ ' ( ~ * ~ !  Their  most general  results, presented i n  
papers,  testimony and brochures, have been made ava i l ab le  t o  us.* These 
do not  present  s u f f i c i e n t  da ta  on t h e  LHZ a i r c r a f t  configurat ion nor 
do they provide information f o r  any comparison with JAF fueled a i r c r a f t .  
Further,  LCH4 fueled a i r c r a f t  is not  given any considerat ion i n  t h e  
ava i l ab le  material. 
and references.  
(2.7,2.8) In-house supported s t u d i e s  were a l s o  conducted by Loth Boeing 
Table 2.1 summarizes the  appropriate  information 
The p r inc ipa l  configurat ion f a c t o r s  are t h e  s i te  and shape of t h e  
a i r c r a f t  and the  loca t ions  within t h e  a i r c r a f t  of t he  passengers,  s to red  
f u e l  and engines. Each t y p e  of f u e l  may requi re  its own p a r t i c u l a r  air- 
c r a f t  configurat ion.  
e igh t  LH2 f u e l  l oca t ion  concepts. 
fuselage,  and two each f o r  f u e l  i n  pods and f u e l  i n  wing. 
ind ica ted  tha t  t he  most favored configurat ion was f u e l  i n  the  fuselage 
In  one of its earlier s tud ie s ,  Lockheed (2 * 3)evaluated 
Four of these included f u e l  i n  the  
Their r e s u l t s  
located fo re  and a f t  of t h e  passenger compartment. 
recent ly  confirmed by Boeing (2.12)and McDonnell Douglas 
This re It was 
( 2 . 3  
The above noted r e s u l t  was a l s o  obtained when Lockheed conducted the  
(2.15) 
methane f u e l  study 
s tud ie s ,  t h e  second most favored f u e l  configurat ion was the  f u e l  located 
i n  twin pods mounted onto and above the  wings. 
more near ly  conforms t o  JAF a i r c r a f t  with f u e l  located i n  the  wings. 
Further,  i n  both t h e  LH2 and the  LCH4 f u e l  
This  latter configurat ion 
The LH2 placement fo re  and a f t ,  as indicated above, leaves unresolved 
the  f ede ra l  regula t ions  requi r ing  passage between the  cockpit  and passenger 
spaces of the  a i r c r a f t .  
* We a l s o  interviewed company r ep resec t e t ives  on rne telephone 
(see References 2.12 and 2.14). 
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In  1973 Boeing a l s o  considered a 747 passenger a i r c r a f t  modified 
f o r  LH2 f u e l  12'10). This modified a i r c r a f t  has a passenger capaci ty  f o r  
369 passengers and a range of 5100 n a u t i c a l  miles. The f u e l  conf igura t ion  
f o r  t h i s  concept was f o r  LH2 with in  the  fuselage i n  tanks loca ted  ober t h e  
passenger compartment. 
on t h e  use of a modified 747 .  
v i a b l e  concept because of the  extensive s t r u c t u r a l  modif icat ions of t h e  
aircraft t h a t  a r e  needed. In add i t ion ,  t h e  747 u t i l i z e s  material and aero- 
dynamic technologies of t he  late 1960's. 
a i r c r a f t  is not expected t o  develop as a complete t r anspor t  system u n t i l  
t h e  e a r l y  1990's. 
w i l l  be app l i cab le  a t  t h a t  t i m e  w i l l  make any modified 747 a i r c r a f t  obso- 
lete. 
Lockheed L-1011 and the  McDonnell Douglas DC-10. 
Boeing was interviewed (2*12) f o r  t h e i r  cur ren t  views 
Boeing no longer considers  t h i s  t o  be a 
On t h e  o the r  hand, t h e  LH2 
Thus, t he  a n t i c i p a t i o n  of t he  new technologies t h a t  
This argument app l i e s  t o  t h e  o the r  wide body a i r c r a f t  such as t h e  
2.3 ANTICIPATED MISSION OF A LH, COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT 
L 
The primary f a c t o r s  required i n  the  canparat ive c rash  f i r e  hazard 
ana lys i s  are t h e  s to red  f u e l  q u a n t i t i e s ,  t h e i r  l oca t ion  wi th in  the  a i r -  
c r a f t  and t h e i r  proximity t o  t h e  passenger compartments, t he  condi t ions 
of  t h e  f u e l  and t h e  deposi t ion of t h e  f u e l  system l i n e s  i n  the  a i r c r a f t ,  
i .e.,  power p lan t  feed, loading and vent l i n e s ,  e t c .  These f a c t o r s  vary 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y  depending on the  type of f u e l  and t h e  a i r c r a f t  misrion. 
To examine t h e  e f f e c t  of t h e  f u e l  type, i t  is des i r ab le  t o  consider 
a i r c r a f t  having the  same mission. 
pated mission of a LH2 a i r c r a f t .  
subsonic commercial a i r c r a f t  are the  passenger capac i ty ,  range and speed. 
They are discussed below. 
To do so, w e  defined f i r s t  t he  a n t i c i -  
The p r inc ipa l  mission parameters of a 
2.3.1 Passenger Capacity 
The passenger capaci ty  (PAX) e s t a b l i s h e s  t h e  mission payload, 
inc ludes  t h e  passengers,  ehe i r  baggage, t he  crew and whatever is needed 
f o r  t h e i r  sus t lnance  and s u r v i v a b i l i t y .  
It 
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The success of t h e  commercial j e t  a i r c r a f t  i n  t h e  e a r l y  1960's brought 
about a rapid expansion i n  passenger se rv ice .  
senger capaci ty  of these  a i r c r a f t  (100 t o  200 passengers) resu l ted  i n  
increased a i r  t r a f f i c  a t  a i r p o r t s  which subsequently l ed  t o  t r a f f i c  con- 
ges t ion  and delays i n  departures  and a r r i v a l s .  
However, t h e  l imi ted  pas- 
T r a f f i c  fo recas t s  prepared by the  a i r  carriers i n  t h e  mid 1960's 
ind ica ted  the  increas ing  a i r  t r a f f i c  congestion at a i r p o r t s  would be 
a l l e v i a t e d  by the  introduct ion of  commercial t ranspor t  a i r c r a f t  of 
g r e a t e r  passenger-carrying capaci ty .  
should not be r e s t r i c t e d  t o  operat ion from those a i r p o r t s  with very long 
runways. 
t h e  Boeing 747, Lockheed L l O l l  and McDonnell Douglas DC-10. These 
a i r c r a f t  made t h e i r  debut i n  1970-1972 time period and have been i n  exten- 
sive commercial s e rv i ce  s ince  t h a t  time. 
It was e s s e n t i a l  t h a t  such a i r c r a f t  
The recognized need l ed  t o  the  development and manufacture of 
Since t h e i r  inauguration, t he  respec t ive  manufacturers have b u i l t  
these  a i r c r a f t  i n  a number of  series t o  meet a v a r i e t y  of commercial 
a i r  service requirements. In  general ,  however, t h i s  group of wide-bodied 
a i r c r a f t  have a nominal capaci ty  of 400 passengers, a range of 2300 t o  
5000 m i l e s  with maxiLa  f u e l  load, and a c ru is ing  speed of Mach 0.82 t o  
0.85. 
fue led  a i r c r a f t  have been based on t h i s  set of requirements, and have 
been demonstrated t o  be l o g i s t i c a l l y  v i ab le  for a present  and fu tu re  
commercial t ranspor t  system. 
The s t u d i e s  t h a t  have been conducted f o r  t h e  l i qu id  hydrogen 
The passenger capac i t i e s  of commercial jet  a i r c r a f t  have shown an 
upward t rend s ince  the  in t roduct ion  of t h e  Dough8 DC-3 i n  1935. This  
t rend is i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  Figure 2.1 fo r  a number of t y p i c a l  a i r c r a f t  i n  
the  1935-1980 period and with pro jec t ions  t o  1985 (2*11). 
promoting t h i s  t rend,  which include d i r e c t  opera t ing  c o s t s  and the  
annual market growth i n  revenue passenger miles, are probably not  
revers ib le .  Thus, Lhs v i a b i l i t y  of t he  l i q u i d  hydrogen f u e l  €or  com- 
mercial a i r c r a f t  would depend on t h e  comparabili ty of l i q u i d  hydrogen 
a t  l a rge  (400 or more) PAX capacities. 
The f a c t o r s  
1 2  
Arthur D Littlelnc 
AlRCRMT SIZE 
(b) 
FIGURE 2 . 1  
PASSENGER AIRCRAFT CAPACITIES 
Source: Robert E .  Hage (See Reference 2 . 1 1 )  
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The Lockheed s t u d i e s  have considered capac i t i e s  from 400 t o  800 PAX, 
but most of t he  d e t a i l e d  ana lys i s  and comparison have been f o r  a 400 PAX 
a i r c r a f  t . 
missions,  respec t ive ly  f o r  the  LH2 fueled a i r c r a f t .  
Boeing ( 2 * 7 ’ 2 * 8 )  and ?lcDonnell Douglas (2*9)  favor 200 and 700 PAX 
Based upon the t rends ,  a 400 PAX a i r c r a f t  i s  not unreasonable and 
may be on the  low s i d e  i n  the  post 1990-1995 time frame, Further ,  the  
bes t  ava i l ab le  design pro jec t ions  are those prepared by Lockheed f o r  a 
400 PAX a i r c r a f t .  These f indings suggest t h a t  the  400 PAX a i r c r a f t  is 
acceptable  f o r  the  cur ren t  study. 
2.3.2 Range 
Commercial a i r c r a f t  ranges are c l a s s i f i e d  as shor t  range (less than 
2,500 n m i ) ,  medium range (between 2,500 and about 4,000 n mi) and long 
range (g rea t e r  than 4,000 n m i ) .  
upon range because of t he  d i r e c t  r e l a t ionsh ip  between the f u e l  requirements 
and range for  a given payload. 
The a i r c r a f t  s i z e  is grea t ly  dependent 
According t o  Hage (2*11), the  passenger a i r c r a f t  market between 1980 and 
1999 w i l l  experience a demand f o r  7,000 a i r c r a f t  of which 30 percent w i l l  
be f o r  medium-range a i r c r a f t  and 25 percent f o r  long-range a i r c r a f t .  
The longer the  range of an a i r c r a f t ,  the  more v e r s a t i l e  i t  Is i n  
Greater range pe rmi t s  longer f l i g h t s ,  the air  t ranspor ta t ion  system. 
more f l e x i b i l i t y  t o  avoid severe weather condi t ions,  and a b i l i t y  t o  hold 
over a i r p o r t s  when t r a f f i c  condi t ions and/or weather delay landing of 
the a i r c r a f t .  Also, where mechanical f a i l u r e s  of an a i r c r a f t  scheduled 
for  f l i g h t  require  a replacement a i rcraf t ,  an a l t e r n a t e  with long range 
capab i l i t y  is a more probable replacement than one with shor t  range 
capab i l i  t y . 
Witcof s k i  (2.13) has shown tha t  range may be an important f ac to r  i n  the  
v i a b i l i t y  of the  LH2 aircraf t .  
sumption of t he  LHZ-fueled a i r c r a f t  with Synjet  fueled a i r c r a f t  shows a 
savings of from 2 t o  33 percent ,  with energy savings increasing with 
range. 
H i s  comparison of the mission energy con- 
14 
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The above arguments serve only t o  ind ica t e  t h a t  i f  t h e  LH2 a i r c r a f t  
comes i n t o  being, i t  w i l l  probably be designed with a long range capa- 
b i l i t y .  
between 1,500 and 10,000 n m i .  
e f f o r t s  on the  5,500 n m i  range a i r c r a f t .  
choice a t  the  present s t age  of development. 
Lockheed has considered a i r c r a f t  designs with range c a p a b i l i t i e s  
However, i t  has concentrated its design 
This appears to  be a reasonable 
2.3.3 Speed 
The average speed of subsonic commercial j e t  a i r c r a f t  has been in- 
c reas ing  very gradual ly  i n  the  l a s t  20 years from about 440 n mi/hr 
(DC-8, B-707) t o  about 470 n mi/hr (B-747, A - 3 0 0 ) .  
Mach no. of about 0.8 a t  35,000 f t .  a l t i t u d e .  
r i s i n g  probably has an asymptote a t  Mach 0.9. 
by Lockheed fo r  the  speed of t he  most favored mission appears reasonable.  
The latter represents  a 
This t rend though s t i l l  
The choice of Mach 0.85 
2.4 AIRCR'FT SELECTED FOR STUDY 
Based on the  information presented above, we conclude t h a t :  
0 Under NASA con t rac t s ,  Lcckheed has conducted and published t h e  
d e f i n i t i v e  source material f o r  subsonic a i r c r a f t  fueled with 
LH2, LCH4 and JAF. 
prehensive ava i l ab le  i n  which the  performance of  a i r c r a f t  designed 
f o r  these  s p e c i f i c  f u e l s  are compared on an i d e n t i c a l  mission bas i s .  
The s tud ie s  are the  most thorough and com- 
0 Lockheed s tn3h- l  R l a r e e  ranye of a i r c r a c t  mjssion?;. me most 
favored and those developed i n  g rea t e s t  d e t a i l  a r e  f o r  a i r c r a f t  
with 400 passengers with a range of 5500 n a u t i c a l  miles a t  a 
speed of Mach 0.85. 
The most favored a i r c r a f t  configurat ion of t h e  LH2 and LCH4 fueled 
a i r c r a f t  is  with the  f u e l  located i n  the fuselage,  fo re  and a f t  
of the  passenger compartment. 
by Lockheed, Boeing and Douglas a i r c r a f t  manufacturers. 
This result was reached independently 
The second most favored configurat ion of the LH2 and LCH4 fueled 
a i r c r a f t  is with the  f u e l  located i n  two wing mounted pylons, 
i .e.,  ex te rna l  f u e l  tanks mounted above the  wings. This con- 
f igu ra t ion  has a g rea t e r  s i m i l a r i t y  t o  the  je t  fueled a i r c r a f t  
15 
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configurat ion f o r  crash hazard ana lys i s  than t h e  fuel-in-fuselage 
configurat ion.  
0 The Lockheed s t u d i e s  are the  only ones ava i l ab le  19 which t h e  LH2 
and LCH4 f u e l  systems are s u f f i c i e n t l y  de t a i l ed  f o r  use i n  the  
crash hazards study. 
Accordingly, f o r  t h e  purpose of t h i s  s tudy,  we se l ec t ed  the  primary 
LH2,LCH4, and JAF fueled a i r c r a f t  configurat ions developed by Lockheed 
f o r  t h e  400 passenger, 5500 nau t i ca l  mile and Mach 0.85 speed, mission. 
The main spec i f i ca t ions  of these a i r c r a f t  are summarized i n  Tabln 2.2. 
The main f ea tu res  of t h e i r  f u e l  system are described i n  Appendix A. 
Additional descr ip t ion  of the  e n t i r e  a i r c r a f t  are given i n  References 
(2.1 t o  2.4 and 2.6). 
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TABLE 2.2 -
SPEC1 F I  CAT IONS OF COMPARABLE 
HYDROGEN, METHANE AND J E T  A FUELED TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT 
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3. HISTORICAL AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT DATA 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
I n  t h i s  sec t ion ,  we present a b r i e f  review of h i s t o r i c a l  a i r c r a f t  
accident  da ta  t o  iden t i fy  possible  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of importance t o  our 
study. Examples of such c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  include quest ions such as: has 
a f i r e  always occurred when a l a rge  amount of f u e l  was released? 
frequent are f u e l  tank explosions i n  an a i r c r a f t  engulfed by flames? 
how o f t e n  is the  passenger compartment breached thereby exposing the  
passengers d i r e c t l y  t o  the  flames from a f u e l  pool f i r e ?  
relative s u s c e p t i b i l i t y  of var ious sec t ions  of t h e  a i r c r a f t  where f u e l  
may be located (such as wing fo r  JAF fue l  and fuselage f o r  cryogenic 
fue l s ) ?  
assessment. 
how 
what is t he  
The answers t o  these  quest ions w i l l  be used t o  guide our hazard 
In  our review of t h e  published l i t e r a t u r e  on accident  da ta ,  we 
found t h a t  a t t e n t i o n  has been placed mainly on tdent i fy ing  various 
accident  scenar ios  and t h e i r  causes. 
i n t e r e s t  t o  us were not  s p e c i f i c a l l y  addressed. 
w e  f i r s t  review a i r c r a f t  a u i d c n t  scenar ios  i n  general  t o  h ighl ight  t h e  
importance of t h e  four generic types t h a t  w i l l  be addressed i n  t h i s  
program (as spec i f i ed  i n  the  Scope of  Work). 
a number of data  sources f o r  t h e i r  u t i l i t y  t o  fu r the r  charac te r ize  these  
scenar ios  and answer the  quest ions ra i sed  above. 
However, somc of the  quest ions of 
In the following paragraphs, 
Secondly, we survey 
3.2 HISTORICAL TRENDS I N  AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS 
In  1979, a f a i r l y  de t a i l ed  study of a i r c r a f t  f i r e  accidents  was 
performed by the  NATO Advisory Group f o r  Aerospace Research and Develop- 
ment (AGARD) 
examination of 1964-1974 c i v i i  a i r c r a f t  e t a t i s t i c e  in t he  U.S. and a 
review of de t a i l ed  n a r r a t i v e  accident repor t s  f o r  each of the  accidento.  
Furthermore, a number of crosschecks are presented I n  t h i s  study wi th  
r e s u l t s  obtained by the  Coordinating Research Couiici'; through a review 
of worldwide accident records. In general ,  acceptable  agreement between 
Lhe two s t u d i e s  w a s  obtained. 
- The results presznted i n  the  study are based on an (3.1) 
18 
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From the  accident da ta ,  AGARD i den t i f i ed  seven f i r e  scenarios  and 
ranked them Ln Table 3.1. 
No. 1, 2, 3 and 7 are fuel-related.  
scenarios (Nos. 1 t o  3) w i l l  be included i n  our  study, with the  excep- 
t i o n  of t he  in- f l igh t  f u e l  tank explosion (Scenario 2A). 
may occur when a conventional-fuel, air-breathing tank is h i t  by l ightning.  
It is impossible, however, in a properly functioning LH2 o r  LcB4 f u e l  
tank where a i r  is ac luded .  Scenario No. 7 is not  crash-related and is 
of l i t t l e  p rac t i ca l  imporance. 
study. 
Of the  scenarios given i n  Table 3.1, only 
The most important of these  
This  scenario 
Consequently, it is not included i n  our 
Thus, h i s t o r i c a l  accident da ta  support the  importance of t he  accident 
scenarios se lec ted  fo r  consideration i n  t h i s  program. 
r e s u l t s  and conclusions of the AGARD study are: 
Additional per t inent  
* 
e Of a l l  civil t ransport  accidents  and inc idents ,  approximately, 
27% are impact-survivable accidents,  
0 Of impact survivable f i r e  accidents,  approximately SOX r e s u l t  
i n  f u e l  release due t o  Wing separat ion of which approximately 
70% result i n  subsequent f a t a l i t y ,  
0 Based on FAA statistics reported by AGARD (during the  1964-1974 
period) 28 U.S. t ransport  a i r c r a f t  impact survivable f i r e  
accidents occurred. F i r e  e f f e c t s  resul ted i n  395 (40%) of t he  
987 f a t a l i t i e s  i n  these accidents.  
0 Of the  28 accidents,  14 involved wing separat ion and the  r e su l t i ng  
f i r e s  and explosions caused 259 f a t a l i t i e s .  Thus, f i r e  hazards 
as a r e s u l t  of wing separat ion account f c r  approximately 65% of 
f i re - re la ted  casua l t i e s  i n  impact survivable a i r c r a f t  . 
Fuel l i n e  and tank damage were the  only f u e l  sources i n  about 
40% of the f i r e  accidents;  and 
* 
Incident r e fe r s  t o  an event i n  which a f i r e  resu l ted  i n  minor damage 
or in jury ,  but no f a t a l i t i e s .  
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TABLE 3.1 
RANKING OF AIRCRAFT FIRE SCENARIOS 
(IN DECREASING INPORTAWE1 
1. Post-Crash Hassive Fuel Spill Fire 
A. Wlng/partial w i n g  separation 
B. Major fuel tapk damage 
2. Fuel Tank Explos ion 
A. Inflight 
8. Post crash 
3. Post-Crash Small Fuel Spill Fire 
A. Minor fuel tank damage 
B. Fuel line damage 
4. Cabin Material Fire 
A. Inflight 
B. Post crash 
5. Propulsion System Fire 
A. Non-contalned titanium fire 
B. Non-contained rotor fragment fire 
6.  Landing Gear System Fire 
A. Maintenance 
B. Inflight 
7. Fuel Tank Explosion 
A. Maintenance 
B. Refueling 
20 
0 Fuel tank explosions occured in 11% of the impact survivable 
accidents. 
The above statistics answer some of the questions raised earlier 
in thi8 section. 
of various aircraft sections to crash impact damage. The se.ttiona of 
interest are the wings and the fuselage where the fuel is ltlcated in 
the conventional and cryogenic aircraft, respectively. In the remainder 
of this section, we will describe the available accident data files and 
our analysis of them to answer this kcv question. 
A key unanswered question is the relative susceptibility 
3.3 ACCIDENT DATA FILES. 
We have examined three major sources of aircraft accident data. 
These sources are: 
3.3.1 
Data on military aviation accidents are maintained by the air 
safety centers. 'The data are, however, confined to an nnalysis of 
causes and their computer files do not provide even qualitative indi- 
cations of the nature of structural damage. The only information on 
structure failures maintained bv the air aafetv center are photographs 
which are occasionally filed with the investigative~ reports. Such infor- 
mation would be available only by a manual review of a lnrgta volume of 
investigation files. Such a review is outside the scope of this program, 
but is recommended in future programs. 
Data Files .-I of the Military Air Safety Centers --- - 
3.3.2 Airframers Data Base 
This data base was developed by airplane manufacturers under NASA 
-.--I-- 
sponsorship in connection with a study of the risks presented by the 
use of carbon fiber composites in commercial aviation. The aircraft 
is divided into 18 components. Based on historical accident data, 
eetimates are given for the percentage of each of these components 
damaged by aircraft fires. Clearly, fire-induced damages are cxpectd 
to be dependent on fuel type. Rather, we are interested in crash- 
induced damaee, prior to any fuel fire. 
not suitable for our objective. 
Thus, the atrframers data are 
21 
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3.3.3 NTSB Data Base 
This data file contains a description of all reportable civil avia- 
tion accidents which occurred from 1964 to 1978. (Reportable accidents 
are defined in 49 CFR Part 830.5 as accidents involving death, serious 
injury or significant airplane damage as well as any incident involving 
flight control malfunction, incapacitation of a required crew member, 
turbine engine rotor failure or in flight fire or collision). 
represents the most comprehensive data source available and will be 
utilized in this program as described below. 
It 
3.4 RELATIVE SUSCEPTIBILITY OF FUEL RELEASE FROM WING-MOUNTED 
AND FUSELACE-MOUNTi? TANKS 
In section 2, we defined the most likely aircraft concepts and 
We configurations for the fuels under consideration in this study. 
anticipate the fuel to be located in the wings for conventional fuel 
aircraft and in the fuselage for cryogenic fuels aircraft. The sus- 
ceptibility of these two locations to impact forces can affect the 
amount of fuel release and the subsequent extent of the hazard. 
Determining the relative susceptibility of wings and fuselage 
purely from structural analysis considerations is not practical in view 
of the expected wide variations and uncertainties in impact conditions. 
Counsequently, we chose to infer the results from the data available on 
real accidents. 
We utilized two sources of data: (1) the detailed analysis of world- 
wide accident data conducted by the Coordinating Research Council and 
reported by AGARD (4*1) and (2) our own analysis of the National Trans- 
portation Safety Board (NTSB) computerized data base. The main features 
of these two data sources are given in Table 3.2. Note that each source 
provides only a part of the answers we seek. 
to the aircraft wings with subsequent fuel release is addressed by AtiARD 
but not by NTSB. 
cryogenic fuel tanks will be mounted) is reported by NTSB but not by 
AGARD. 
the relative susceptibility of placing the fuel in the wings versus in 
For example, the damage 
On the other hand, the damage to the fuselage (where 
Accordingly, we combined the data is these two sources to compare 
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the fuselage. This is described in the following paragraphs. 
3.4.1 Data Examined in the NTSB Data File 
The NTSB data file contains a wealth of information related to 
accident conditions. 
accident that we will utilize in this study. 
required for some of these descriptions while it is optional for others 
(as indicated in Table 3.3). 
analysis quite difficult. 
Table 3.3 gives the NTSB descriptions for each 
Note that reporting is 
This incompleteness in the data made our 
The data file gives a total of 65,671 accident reports. They 
include many accidents (e.g., light aircraft) which are not relevant to 
the LH2 aircraft hazard analysis. Consequently, we have restricted our 
analysis to those accidents which reportedly involved takeoff or landing 
operations of heavy turbine-powered aircraft engaged in passenger service, 
cargo or ferry operations (630 accidents). 
We must also focus on only impact-survivable accidents to analyze 
the crash fire hazards of various fuels. However, the NTSB accident 
file does not distinguish between impact and fire fatalities. This dis- 
tinction has no significant influence on this study since only 36 of the 
630 accidents ( i . e . ,  = 5%) had no survivors. The inclusion of some 
fraction of these accidents in the data base would, therefore, result 
in a negligible change in the overall statietics. 
Of the 630 accidents, we found 73 reporting fires and 82 reporting 
a description of the impact damage by aircraft section. 
are summarized in Table 3.4 for each reference. Note that all numbers 
are sufficiently large to provide meaningful estimates. 
These data 
3.4.2 Fuel Release From Conventional-Fueled Aircraft (ASARD Da€a) 
In 1979, a fairly detailed study of aircraft fire accidents was 
conducted by the NATO Advisory Croup for Aerospace Research and Develop- 
ment (AGARD). 
Coordinating Research Council (CRC) on world-wide aircraft accidents 
over the period of 1964-1974. 
the number of accidents involving fuel release during takeoff and 
landing. 
This study reported on the results obtained by the 
The CRC data give a detailed breakdown of 
The data are given in Table 3.5 and indicate the mode of fuel 
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Item -
Extent of overall 
impact damage 
Impact darnage severity 
(non-f ire) to : 
-- cockpit 
- forward cabin 
- center cabin 
-- aft cabin 
-- occupied areas 
TABLE 33-1 
DATA UTILIZED FROM NTSB TAPE 
Fire 
Extent of fire damage 
Stopping distance 
Speed at Impact 
Number of passengers 
Number of fatalities 
Aircraft weight 
category 
Description/Unit Report in& 
Destroyed-substantial-minor-none Required 
Opt lonal 
Extreme-severe-moderate-minor-none 
I1 
*l 
I1  
11 
Yes/No Required 
Destroyed-substantial-minor-nor-none- Optional 
not reported 
Feet 
MPH 
Optional 
Optional 
Person Required 
Person Required 
Light/Heavy Required 
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- TABLE 3 . 4  
DATA SETS EXAMINED I N  THE NTSB FILE 
Item 
Total reported aircraft accidents 
-
Number of reports involving takeoff or 
landing of heavy fixed wing turbine 
aircraft 
Number involving one or more survivors 
Number of survivable accidents involving f i r e  
Number of survivable accidents where damage is 
reported by aircraft section 
Number of Reports 
65,671 
630 
594 
79 
82 
26 
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TABLE 3.5 
NUMBER OF ACCIDENTS INVOLVING FUEL RELEASE 
AND THE OCCURRENCE OF FIRE I N  THESE ACCIDENTS 
(AGARD DATA) (1964-1974) 
Cause of fue l  release 
Fuel tank damage only 
Fuel l i n e  damage only 
Combined tank and l i n e  damage 
Wing separation 
Total 
Occurrence of f i r e  
No -Yes -
39 26 
7 4 
5 4 
48 0 -
97* 
* 
AGARD gives  a to ta l  number of f i r e s  (97) s l i ght ly  smaller than the  sum (99) of 
the various release modes! 
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release (damage t o  a f u e l  l i n e  o r  a f u e l  tank, and wing sepa ra t ion )  and 
the occurrence of f i r e .  
It is of note  t h a t  a l l  48 accidents  involving wing separat ion have 
This is reasonable s i n c e  t h e  impact energy required r e su l t ed  i n  f i r e s .  
t o  break a wing is seve ra l  o rde r s  of magnitude l a r g e r  than t h a t  required 
t o  ignite a f u e l  a i r  mixture. In  the accidents  involving the  o the r  f u e l  
release modes, t h e  data  i n  Table 3.5 i n d i c a t e  t h a t  i g n i t i o n  is  l i k e l y  
but no t  ce r t a in .  
It is unfortunate t h a t  AGAFJI d id  not r epor t  the t o t a l  number of 
takeoff and landing accidents  frcm which t h e  d a t a  i n  Table 3.5 are ex- 
t r ac t ed .  This can be i n f e r r e d ,  towever, by assuming t h a t  t h e  f r a c t i o n  
of f i r e  occurrences i n  takeoff and landing accidents  is t he  same as 
t h a t  f o r  t he  NTSB da ta  f i l e .  From Table 3 . 4 ,  t h i s  f r a c t i o n  is - = 0.13. 
Thus, the  corresponding number of accidents  i n  the  AGARD d a t a  base is 
97 - = 770 accidents .  Therefore, an estimate of t he  p robab i l i t y  of wing 0.13 
separat ion,  given a takeoff o r  landing accident  is - * 0.06 or 6%. 
79 
630 
i 8  
770 
3 .4 .3  Impact-Damage by A i r c r a f t  Section (NTSB Data) 
As shown in Table 3.3 r epor t ing  t h e  o v e r a l l  impact damage t o  the  * 
a i r c r a f t  is required by NTSB, while r epor t ing  the  damage t o  each s e c t i o n  
of the a i r c r a f t  is l e f t  t o  the d i s c r e t i o n  of t he  NTSB inves t iga to r .  Con- 
sequently,  only 82 of the  630 takeoff and landing accidents  contain damage 
da ta  by aect ion.  
These 82 accidents  are not a r ep resen ta t ive  sample s i n c e  they cons l s t  
mainly of severe accidents  where r epor t ing  is expected t o  be more thorough. 
This f a c t  is supported by the  d a t a  i n  Table 3.6,which compares the  o v e r a l l  
a i r c r a f t  damage s e v e r i t y  with the r epor t ing  of s e c t i o n a l  damage. 
t h a t  the probabi l i ty  (or  f r a c t i o n )  of reported s e c t i o n a l  damage decreases 
as the  o v e r a l l  impact t o  the a i r c r a f t  decreases. 
t h e  sample t o  the e n t i r e  population, tire number of acc iden t s  i n  each 
overall-aircraft-impact-damage category was weighted by the  inverse of 
t he  Corresponding p robab i l i t y  of report ing.  
Note 
To ex t r apo la t e  from 
* 
The a i r c r a f t  is divided i n t o  four sect ions:  
and eft cabins. 
cockpit ,  and forward, center  
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TABLE 3.6 
COMPARISON OF OVERALL AIRCRAFT DAMAGE SEVERITY 
FOR ACCIDENTS WITH AND WITHOUT REPORTS ON 
SECTIONAL DAMAGE (NTSB DATA) 
OVERALL -AIRCRAFT 
IMPACT-DAMAGE CATEGORY 
Destroyed 
Substantial 
Minor 
None 
Unknown 
Total 
REPORTED SECTIWU DAMAGE * 
N C  of Accid* Fraction 
44 0.44 
30 0.12 
7 0.03 
1 0.02 
0 0 - 
82 
UNREPORTED SECTIONAL DAMAGE& 
No. of Accidents Fraction 
56 0.56 
223 0.88 
207 0.97 
61 0.98 
1 1.00 - 
548 
* 
Fraction of the total number of accidents in the same overall-aircraft- 
Impact-damage category 
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When reported,  t h e e x t e n t  of damage t o  each sec t ion  is described * 
i n  a q u a l i t a t i v e  fashion as "extreme, severe,  moderate, minor o r  none''. 
But these  terms are no t  w e l l  defined by t h e  NTSB and are thus l e f t  l a rge ly  
at t h e  d i sc re t ion  of t he  accident  inves t iga tors .  Based on conversations 
with NTSB personnel, we can confident ly  state t h a t  a r a t i n g  of "extreme" 
denotes extensive s t r u c t u r a l  damage, i .e.,  a l i k e l y  breach of a i r c r a f t  
i n t e g r i t y ;  while "minor" denotes no s i g n i f i c a n t  damage t o  the  a i r c r a f t  
s t ruc tu re .  The intermediate  ca tegor ies  are less c l e a r ,  however. To 
mi t iga t e  t h i s  d i f f i c u l t y ,  we assumed two d e f i n i t i o n s  of breach of 
i n t e g r i t y  corresponding t o  "extreme" and "extreme o r  severe". 
d e f i n i t i o n  is conservat ive and places  an upper bound of t he  probabi l i ty  
estimate of breach of i n t e g r i t y .  
The second 
We counted t h e  number of  accident.8 i n  the  NTSB da ta  sample which 
correspond t o  these  two de f in i t i one  and t r ans l a t ed  them i n t o  a probabi l i ty  
estimate of damage given a takeoff o r  landirig accident .  
shown i n  Table 3.7 f o r  a l l  poss ib le  combinations of  damage t o  the  cockpi t ,  
forward, cen te r  and a f t  cabins. 
have occurred so f a r .  The r e s u l t s  w i l l  be fu r the r  discussed below. 
'i'he r e s u l t s  are 
Note t h a t  not a l l  combinations of damage 
3.4.4 Suscep t ib i l i t y  of ImPaCt-D;ma&e t o  Fuselage-Mounted Tanks (NTSB Data) 
Since LH or LCH would be s to red  i n  two tanks loca ted  i n  t h e  forward 2 4 
and a f t  areas respec t ive ly ,  the  following th ree  release modes are poss ib le :  
0 Release from forward tank alone,  
0 Release from a f t  tank alone,  
0 Simultaneous relea :e from both tanks.  
These d i s t i n c t i o n s  are important because they imply d i f f e r e n t  volumes 
of f u e l  s p i l l a g e  as w e l l  as d i f f e r e n t  s p i l l  l oca t ions  with respec t  t o  the  
passenger compartment. 
may impact t he  o t h e r  tank. 
Also, release and ign i t ion  of f u e l  from one tank 
The occurrence rates of these  th ree  f u e l  release modes can be estimated 
from the  observed damage l e v e l s  of t h e  individual  a i r c r a f t  s ec t ions  i n  
Table 3.7. 
* 
Note tha t  these terms are d i f f e r e n t  from those used i n  Table 3.6 t o  
descr ibe o v e r a l l  impact damage t o  t h e  a i r c r a f t .  
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In p a r t i c u l a r ,  sicce the  f u e l  tank loca t ions  proposed f o r  t h e  LH2 
o r  LCH4 a i r c r a f t  approximately coincide with the  forward and a f t  cabin 
areas of tl conventional a i r c r a f t ,  t he  probabi l i ty  of s i @ i f i c a n t  damge 
t o  these areas can be used t o  approximate release from :hese tanks. The 
r e s u l t s  a r e  given i n  Table 3.8. 
A4.5 Comparison of the Probabi l i ty  of Massive Fuel Release from. 
Fuselage-Mounted and Wing-Mounted Tanks 
In the  last sec t ion ,  we estimated the  probabi l i ty  of breaching t h e  
fuselage in takeoff o r  landing accidents  of heavy airc.r=lft.  This escimate 
is only approximat- s ince  i t  is based on t h e  subjec t ive  evaluat ion da ta  of  
the  NTSB Inves t iga tor ;  and on an ex t rapola t ion  from an 32-record sample 
t o  a population of 630 records.  S t i l l ,  i t  represents  the bes t  a v a i l a b l e  
cstimate of a p o t e n t i a l  massive f u e l  release from a fuselage-munted tank.  
This estimate is i n  the neighborhood of 0.08 w i t h  an upper bound 
(from Table 3.8). 
* 
of 0.17 
We have a l s o  estimated ( i n  Section 3.3.2) t h e  probabi l i ty  of cdng 
separa t ion  t o  be about 0.06. 
i t  is based on the  combination of two separate da ta  bases. 
of t h e  unce r t a in t i e s  i n  our two estimates, w e  conclude t h a t  t he  
probabi l i ty  of a massive f u e l  r e l ease  (based on an analvsis of historical 
da ta )  is e s s e n t i a l l y  t h e  same f o r  both types of f u e l  tanks. 
This number is a l s o  approximate s i n c e  
In  view 
r +  9
3.5 CONCLUSIONS 
Our review of s t u d i e s  of h i s t o r i c a l  a i r c r a f t  accidents  confirmed 
the  importance of the  crash f i r e  scenarios  se l ec t ed  f o r  study i n  t h i s  
pro jec t .  In addi t ion ,  our review of a c t u a l  accident  da ta  f i l e  suggests  
t h a t  the fuselage and the  wing are etua’ly vulnerable  t o  impact forces .  
Thus, fo r  t he  purpose of comparative c rash  f i r e  hazard ana lys i s ,  we 
can assume that f o r  given accident  c o n d i t i m s ,  the  t o t a l  content of a 
f v e l  tank w i l l  be re leased regardless  of t h e  loca t ion  of t h e ’ f u e l  ~ 
tank. 
* 
Which is based on a more conservative d e f i n i t i o n  of fuselage damage. 
32 
Arthur D Little Irc 
TABLE 3.8 
ESTIMATED PROBABILITIES FOR BREACHING_ 
FUSELAGE-MOUNTED TANKS (NTSB DATA) 
* 
Categories in Table 3.7 Probability Estimate 
Forward tan’ only 2, 6, 10, 13 0.03 - 0.03 
Aft tank only 4, 7, 12, 14 0 - 0.03 
Both forward and aft tanks 1, 3, 9, 11 0.04 - 0.11 
Either forward or aft tank All of the above 0.08 - 0.17 
* 
Probability given a takeoff or landing accident. The two dalues 
correspond to the two damage definitions described above. 
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6 .  CHARACTERIZATION OF FUEL RELEASE CONDITIONS 
In t h e  statement of work, NASA ou t l ined  four accident scenarios to  
be exomined i n  t h i s  study: 
1. A nonnormal landing or ground accident which r e s u l t s  i n  
f u e l  system insu la t ion  damage and/or f u e l  system damaRe 
permit t ing l i q u i d  hydrogen t o  vent,  escape, leak  or run 
out of a punctured tank or b r t k n  l i n e .  
2. A survivable  "crash" landing or f a i l e d  "takeoff" where 
damage t o  f u e l  tankage or l ines r e s u l t s  i n  massive re- 
lease of l i qu id  hydrogen a f t e r  t h e  a i r c r a f t  has come t o  
rest. 
3. A survivable  "crash" landing or f a i l e d  "takeoff" where 
damage t o  f u e l  tankage or l i n e s  resd ts  i n  massive 
release of l i q u i d  hydrogen upon impact and during alr- 
c r a f t  decelerat lon.  
4. A ca ta s t roph ic  c rash  r e s u l t i n g  i n  the  maximum rate of 
energy re leaae  i n  the  form of a c o n f l s ~ r a t i o n  and/or 
explosion. 
In t h i s  s ec t ion ,  w e  i d e n t i f y ,  based on engineering judNmer.t, spec i f jc  
a i r c r a f t  f a i l u r e  modes that can be associated with t h e w  scenar ios .  We 
can then cha rac t e r i ze  the  fue l  release condi t ions for each f a i l u r e  mode. 
This provides the  range of f u e l  release t o  be expected In eech scena r io  
and f o r  each a i r c r a f t  type. 
We have a lso assessed i n  a q u e l i t a t l v e  w a v  t he  l ikel ihood of each 
f a i l u r e  mode f o r  each a i r c r a f t  systtw. This l ikelfhood can vary 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y  
a i r c r a f t  system. 
and should be noted when comparing the  hazard fram each 
4.1 POSTULATED FAILURE MODES/EVENTS -
Based on engineering judgement, wc have i d e n t i f i e d  e igh t  f a i l u r e  
modeelevents t ha t  mav 1.eed t o  f u e l  release. 
1. Vibration: 
connections and supports,  causing f r a c t u r e  of t he  tanks  and l i n e s  
and loosening o f  t h e i r  connections, w i t h  the  r e s u l t  that  f u e l  is 
S t r e s s  f a t igue  of t he  tanks and l i n e s  and t h e i r  - 
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re leased a t  a rate r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  s i z e  of t he  opening and pressure 
within the  containment. 
2. Strained Maneuver: h e r s t r e s s i n g  of t h e  tanks and l i n e s  and 
t h e i r  connections and supports  producing a breach i n  t h e  contain- 
ment similar t o  t h a t  caused by v ib ra t lon .  
3. Engine Burst: Breaching of t he  l i n e s  and tanks by f a i l e d  engine 
components, such as tu rb ine  blades shed bv the  high rpm machinery 
i n  a r a d i a l  d i r ec t ion .  
4. Sheared Engine Pod: Broken o r  sheared f u e l  l i n e s  caused bv the  
loss of engines,  i .e.,  as when landing gear f a i l u r e  cnuses engines 
to  s t r ike the  ground. 
5 .  Failed Thermal Insu la t ion :  The LH and I.CH4 f u e l  tanks  ana 
l i n e s  must be thermally insu la ted .  
excessive gas generation t h a t  can cause pressure f a i l u r e  of t he  
tank. Insulat ion f a i l u r e  on the  l i n e s  w i l l  i n t e r r u p t  t he  f u e l  flow 
t o  the engine. 
2 
Insulat ion f a i l u r e  causes 
6 .  
sheared from the  fuselage by ground obstruct ions.  The fuselage 
remains i n t a c t .  
Sheared Wing: Wing tank l i n e s  are breached when the  wing is 
7.  Broken Fuselage: Fuselage tanks  and l i n e s  are breached by 
impact of t he  fuselage with t h e  ground or obstruct ion.  The wings 
remain i n t a c t .  
8 .  Fragmented Ai rc ra f t :  A l l  f u e l  tanks and l i n e s  are breached 
regardless  of t h e i r  locat ion i n  the  a i r c r a f t .  
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These failure modes/events can all cause a line or a tank rupture 
leading to a fuel release as illustrated in Table 4.1. 
insulation failure of a cryogenic system can lead to direct venting of 
gas or liquid). However, the probable number of fuel systems affected 
in each case and its relative likelihood &re differen.. This is shown 
in Table 4.2, where likelihood is assessed qualitativelv (based on engln- 
eering judgment) and is denoted bv 0 * Nil, L - Low. M - Medium, H - HiRh and 
1 = Certain. Note that each failure mode/event mav have the S Y ~  effect 
for the LH and LCH methane fuel systems, but a different effect for 
the Jet A fuel system. This is due principally to the location of the 
LH2 and LCH4 fuel tanks within the fuselage, and to their special 
construction. 
(In addition, 
2 4 
For example, Table 4.2 st.ows that an engine burst is expected not 
to damage the cryogenic fuel tanks but to damage the Jet A fuel tanks. 
Further, the Jet A fuel tanks are not thermally insulated and, therefore, 
cannot fail because of a failed insulation. On the other hand, a 
fragmented aircraft has a high probabilitv of causing all three fuel 
systems to fail completely. Thus, Table 4.2 is an attempt c o  establish 
the relative susceptibility of the three types of fuel svstems to the 
same failure modes or events. 
- 4 . 2  FUEL RELEASE __ RATES AND QUANTITIES 
When a fuel system failure occurs, the rate of release depends 
upon the location and size of the breach and on the fuel pressure. For 
example, a severed fuel line at the outboard engines has a limited 
release rate. On the other hand, a badly ruptured tank can dump its 
fuel load very quickly. 
In Appendix A ,  we present a detailed discription of the fuel tanks 
for LH2, LCH4 and Jet fuel aircraft, including the tank size and number, 
booster pumps, flow rates and the line sizes and pressures. 
estimate the fuel release rates for various locations of the breaks in the 
piping and various penetration sizes i n  the fuel tank. The results are 
described in detail in Appendix A. 
summarized in Table 4 . 3  for the eight failure modes/events. Note that, 
for a single failure mode, the fuel flow rates can vary significantlv 
We also 
The results of Appendix A are 
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among t h e  th ree  a i r c r a f t  systems. 
t o  lead t o  a s m a l l  release f o r  t he  cryogenic a i r c r a f t ;  while  it may l ead  
to  a massive release f o r  J e t  A a i r c r a f t .  
assoc ia ted  with scenar io  1 f o r  the  cryogenic a i r c r a f t ,  and with scenar io  
2 (o r  3) f o r  t h e  Jet A a i r c r a f t .  
par ing the  crash hazards of t h e  two types of systems. 
For example, sheared wings is l i k e l y  
Thus, sheared wings should be 
This point  should be remembered i n  com- 
Fina l ly ,  i n  Table 4.4, we a s soc ia t e  each of t h e  four  accident  
scenar ios  with a number of f a i l u r e  modes and events ,  and show the  b a s i s  
f o r  t h e  ca l cu la t ion  of t h e  f u e l  r e l e a s e  rate o r  quant i ty  i n  each case. 
The dura t ion  of these  f u e l  releases w i l l  be assumed continuous f o r  
small l eaks  and over a period of up t o  a few minutes f o r  scenar ios  2 
and 3. 
presented i n  t4s following chapters. 
These r e s u l t s  w i l l  be used as input  f o r  the  f i r e  hazard analyses  
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5. QUALITATIVE DISCUSSION OF POTENTIAL HAZARDS 
I n  t h i s  sec t ion ,  w e  consider the four  generic  accident  scenarios  
de l inea ted  by NASA i n  our Statement of Work and d iscuss  t h e  physical  
processes occurr ing during the  progression of events  i n  t h e  accident  
scenario.  The major hazard models used i n  t h e  de t a i l ed  ana lys i s  and 
comparison are presented i n  Sect ions 6 and 7. 
5.1 MINOR FUEL RELEASE 
Minor Fuel tank o r  l i n e  damage can occur during take-off r o l l  o r  
landing approach due t o  landing genr f a i l u r e  o r  impact with obs tac les  
as a r e s u l t  of i n s u f f i c i e n t  d i r e c t i o n a l  control .  Such an accident  
may r e s u l t  i n  the  f u e l  leaking t o  the  outs ide  of the aircraft o r  t o  
an  i n t e r n a l  compartment. These two cases  are considered below. 
5.1.1 Minor Release t o  the  Ai rc ra f t  Exter ior  
Consider a small l i q u i d  f u e l  leak  from a moving a i r c r a f t .  The 
f u e l  w i l l  e x i t  as a j e t  and the  l i qu id  a i r  i n t e r f a c e  w i l l  break down 
i n t o  d rop le t s  due t o  shear  forces.  
w i l l  be formed. The condi t ions f o r  t he  formation of aerosols ,  t h e i r  
size d i sc r ibu t ion  o r  even the  source s t r eng th  ( i n  kg/s) of f u e l  release 
may not  oe very easy t o  evaluate unless the leak  flow rate is ex te rna l ly  
cont ro l led  such as by a f u e l  pump. 
A two-phase vapor-aerosol* j e t  
As a i r  is entrairred i n t o  t h i s  je t ,  the  d rop le t s  w i l l  evaporate. 
Evaporation w i l l  depend on the  v o l a t i l i t y  of the  fue l ,  being f a s t e s t  
f o r  hydrogen and slowest f o r  Jet A. 
evaporation and can be r ead i ly  appl ied once the  drople t  diameter is 
known. 
Models are ava i l ab le  f o r  d rop le t  
( 5  1) 
* 
A vapor-aerosol mixture is a two-phase mixture where t h e  l i q u i d  phase 
is concentrated i n  the  form of d rop le t s  that are too small t o  sett le 
out.  
increase the mixture dens i ty  s ign i f i can t ly .  
The d rop le t s  are entrained i n  the  vapor phase and therefore  
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I f  t h i s  J e t  ign i tes , "  a flame w i l l  develop and may Attach i t s e l f  
t o  the a i r c r a f t  o r  blow away, depending on the  a i r c r a f t  speed and the  
f lowfield near the  region of f u e l  release. (" 
experimental da t a  exis t  f o r  descr ibing the  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of an 
at tached je t  f i r e  give9 the  s t r eng th  of t h e  source and the  type of fue l .  
Analyt ical  models and 
These c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  include flame diameter, length and tem,,erature 
d i s t r ibu t ion .  (5.2) 
The thermal r ad ia t ion  from such f i r e s  can a l s o  be ca lcu la ted  using 
has recent ly  presented a (5 .3)  ava i l ab le  models. For example, Becker 
methodology f o r  ca l cu la t ing  t h e  r ad ia t ion  from n a t u r a l  gas f l a r e  f i r e s .  
Tan ( 5 m k )  has given monographs f o r  f l a r e  s t ack  design taking i n t o  con- 
s ide ra t ion  the thermal r ad ia t ive  e f f ec t s .  
5.1.2 Internal Release 
A small f u e l  release i n t o  an internal compartment of t he  a i r c r a f t  
may perhaps be more hazardous than a release t o  the ex te rna l  environment. 
The rcleased f u e l  w i l l  evaporate r e l a t i v e l y  slowly i n  the  case of Jet A 
and r a the r  rapidly i n  the  case  of LCH4 and LH2. 
po ten t i a l  hazards from such leaks: 
a cryogenic f u e l  comes i n  contact  with an uninsulated me ta l l i c  s t ruc tu re ) .  
There are two main 
explosions and thermal shock (when 
For a given f u e l  release i n t o  an i n t e r n a l  compartment, i t  is 
possible  t o  estimate with ava i l ab le  models t he  evaporation rate, the  
mixing rate of vapors with a i r  and, i f  there  is ign i t ion ,  t h e  explosive 
y ie ld .  It  w i l l  be d i f f i c u l t ,  however, t o  determine whether simple 
de f l ag ra t ive  burning w i l l  occur o r  whether detonat ion w i l l  ensue. 
both types of combustion of vapors may pose a t h r e a t  t o  the passengers, 
detonat ion w i l l  probably pose the g rea t e s t  t h rea t .  The present ly  ava i l ab le  
models are not  adequate t o  spec i fy  the exact  condi t ions under which 
detonat ion w i l l  result .  (The propensity f o r  detonat ion w i l l  be enhanced 
by s t r u c t u r e s  i n  the hold, addi t iona l  confinement and the  n a t u r e  of t h e  
i g n i t i o n  source.) 
While 
* 
Poten t i a l  i gn i t i on  sources include hot engine sur faces ,  f r i c t i o n  
sparks o r  hat  brakes. 
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5.2 MASSIVE FUEL RELEASE W I T H  AIRCRAFT AT REST 
I n  t h i s  accident  scenario,  wing separat ion o r  major f u e l  system 
damage is assumed t o  occur, due t o  impact with an obs tac le  late i n  
landing ro l l  o r  during the  f i n a l  dece lera t ion  of a comparatively minor 
crash. 
a r e s u l t  of 105s of d i r e c t i o n a l  con t ro l  subsequent t o  landing gear 
f a i l u r e  . 
A t yp ica l  scenario might be a c o l l i s i o n  with an obs tac le  as 
A massive f u e l  release is assumed a f t e r  the  a i r c r a f t  has come t o  
rest. 
genic f u e l s  (LH2 and LCH4); spread and evaporate i n  the  case of Jet A.  
Also, i n  the  case of LH2, because of the  higher than ambient tank 
preseure, some f l a sh ing  of l i q u i d  t o  vapor w i l l  occur,  The ex ten t  of 
l i qu id  spread on the  ground, and the t o t a l  vapor l i b e r a t i o n  have been 
recent ly  modeled. 
The f u e l  w i l l  spread on the  ground and b o i l  i n  the case of cryo- 
(5.5) 
Should ign i t i on  occur,  a turbulent  diffusion-control led pool f i r e  
The height of t h i s  flame has been modeled by Thomas ( fo r  w i l l  r e s u l t .  
low Froude Number ( 5 * 6 ) ;  and the r e s u l t i n g  thermal r ad ia t ion  f i e l d  
(5.7) by Raj 
The pool f i r e  w i l l  engulf the a i r c r a f t  thereby possibly threatening 
adjacent  f u e l  tanks.  
tanks can explode. 
i n  a r i s i n g  f i r e b a l l .  
and Hardee e t  a1 . 
After s u f f i c i e n t  heating by the pool f i r e ,  these 
Y-m explosion of a f u e l  tank, i t s  contents  may burn 
(5 8) Fireballs have been modeled by Fay and L e w i s  
( 5 . 9 )  
Should i g n i t i o n  be delayed, the  vapors generated from a cryogenic 
f u e l  pool, w i l l  d i sperse  i n  the wind forming a vapor cloud. 
c r i t i ca l  t o  determine whether the cloud is i n i t i a l l y  negat ively buoyant 
and the  d i s t ance  i t  w i l l  t r a v e l  before becoming pos i t i ve ly  buoyant. 
the  cloud is pos i t i ve ly  buoyant, it w i l l  rise and the  hazard w i l l  
e s s e n t i a l l y  d i s s ipa t e .  
It is 
Once 
A t  s a tu ra t ion ,  LCH4 vapor is heavier than a i r  and g r a v i t a t i o n a l  
spreading e f f e c t s  are not iceable  i n  l a rge r  re leasee.  
formed, the  d ispers ing  cloud w i l l .  be even more negat ively buoyant and 
is l i k e l y  t o  d isperse  a t  grade. 
I f  aeroaol  is 
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Saturated LM vapor is about the same dens i ty  as air and, i f  2 
heated, can become pos i t i ve ly  buoyant. Again, i f  aerosol  is formed, 
the  dispers ing cloud may be negat ively buoyant. 
a d ispers ing  aerosol  cloud of JAF. 
This is a l s o  t r u e  of 
I n  one l a rge  scale s p i l l  test of l i q u i d  hydrogen, conducted by ADL 
i n  1960, a long (fog) cloud was seen t o  d i spe r se  a t  ground level and 
no plume rise w a s  observed. This i s sue  is being fu r the r  inves t iga ted  by 
NASA (Langley). In  addi t ion,  a number of experimental research programs 
are present ly  under way t o  generate  a b e t t e r  understanding OF the  d is -  
pers ion behavior of var ious heavier-than-air-vapors. These programs 
include: (i) t he  l i que f i ed  n a t u r a l  gas (JAG) d ispers ion  tests a t  t h e  
Naval Weapons Center, China Lake, Cal i forn ia ,  f o r  t he  U.S. Department 
of Energy; (ii) the  ammonia s p i l l  tests a t  the  above loca t ion  f o r  the  
F e r t i l i z e r  I n s t i t u t e  and the  U.S. Coast Guard; (iii) the  Porton Down 
tests i n  England involving the instantsneous release of Freon; ( iv )  the 
(proposed) heavy Rae dispers ion t r i a l s  on behalf of the  Health and 
Safety Executive of the B r i t i s h  Government and other  pa r t i c ipan t s ;  and 
(v) the LNG s p i l l  tests conducted by Shel l  UK Ltd. on Maplin Sands, 
England. These tests are a l l  i n  various phases of development. I n  
many cases, the  da ta  are unavailable or they have not been analyzed as 
yet .  
There are severa l  models i n  the  l i t e r a t u r e  descr ibing the d ispers ion  
behavior of heavier-than-air gases under a wide raage of condi t ions.  
Models which d iscuss  the  dispers ion of vapors re leased passively (as 
(5.10) from a boi l ing  pool of l i qu id )  include Germeles and Drake, 
and Colenbrander . (5* 13) Van Ulden, Recently, a (5.12) Britter , (5.11) 
model has been developed f o r  the  dispers ion of heavy gases containing 
unstable aerosols  re leased from s t acks  of var ious he igh t s .  
a r e  a l s o  models i n  t h e  air  pol lu t ion  l i t e r a t u r e  deal ing w i t h  release 
of neu t r a l  and pos i t ive ly  buoyant vapors from stacks.  
(5.14) 
There 
I n  general ,  the  dispers ion of vapors i n  the  f a r - f i e ld  (after 
s u f f i c i e n t  d i lu t ion )  can be predicted with reasciaable accuracy by the  
standard Gaussian models of  Pasqui l l  (5*15) and Gif ford . However , (5.16) 
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i n  t he  near-f ie ld ,  these models have t o  be modified t o  taka i n t o  account 
the e f f e c t s  of i n i t i a l  g r a v i t a t i o n a l  spreading, j e t  mixirg o r  the e f f e c t s  
of aerosol  evaporation. 
Should the  d ispers ing  flammable plume encounter an i g n i t i o n  source 
8 vai>or cloud f i r e  w i l l  occur. Recent l a r g e  scale experiments on the  
i g n i t i o n  of l i que f i ed  na tu ra l  gas and propane vapor clouds produced a 
highly turbulent  def l a g r a t  ive  burning. l5  
have a l s o  indicated similar behavior i n  which the  flame speed is i n  t h e  
10 m / s  t o  20 m/s range. However, small scale laboratory tests 
conducted with obs t ruc t ions  i n  the  path of an advancing f i r e  i nd ica t e  
s i g n i f i c a n t  f l a r e  acce lera t ions  up t o  about 100 m/s .  (5*19) 
latter case, s i g n i f i c a n t  overpressures may r e s u l t  with the  p o t e n t i a l  of 
blast-induced damage t o  the  surroundings. 
Other f i e l d  experiments 
In  t h e  
5.3 MASSIVE RELEASE WITH AIRCRAFT-IN M O T I E  
This accident  scenar io  may oc ir due t o  a i r c r a f t  overshootine an 
Its importance approach o r  c o l l i d i n g  with obstacle3 during take-off. 
was noted i n  the  AGARDstudy, while f u e l  release with the  a i r c r a f t  a t  
rest was not  noted by AGARD. 
du;ing the same accident ,  however, s ince  p a r t  of the f u e l  may be released 
while the a i r c r a f t  is i n  motion and the rest a f t e r  the a i r c r a f t  s tops.  
They can both be tnought of as occurring 
Accident da ta  show tha t  c o l l i s i o n  may cause the separat ion of one 
wing, both wings, o r  s t r u c t u r a l  damage of one wing followr.' by separa t ion  
of the  o ther  wing. 
f u e l  d rop le t s  which are r ead i ly  ign i ted  and which provide an i g n i t i o n  
source for subsequently re leased fue l .  
release and a i r c r a f t  coming t o  rest may be up t o  10  seconds. 
source8 include hot engine surfaces ,  i n t e r n a l  engine f i r e ,  severed 
dec t r ica l  wiring, f r i c t i o n  sparks ,  o r  hot brakes. 
A i r  shear r e s u l t s  i n  the  formation of m i s t  of 
The period between i n i t i a l  f u e l  
Ign i t ion  
To our knowledge, t h i s  f i r e  scenario has not  been modeled as ye t .  
However, i t s  modeling appears f e a s i b l e  based on cur ren t  krrowledge. The 
f i r e  produced can be thought of as a combination of the  two types of 
f i r e s  described in the previous two scenarios .  Part of the re leased  
f u e l  w i l l  burn as a sp ray  ( l i k e  i n  Scenario No. l), while t he  rest w i l l  
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fall on the ground as a liquid stream and will burn somewhat like a 
pool fire (Scenario No. 2). 
The geometry of the liquid stream will be determined by the fuel 
release rate, the aircraft motion, the liquid spread rate due to gravi- 
tational forces, and its rate of consumption in the fire. 
spreads, it will evaporate due to heat transfer from the fire and from 
the k-rmer ground (for cryogenic fuels only). 
air and burn a turbulent diffusion-controlled flame. 
As the liquid 
The vapors will mix with 
The relative sizes of the spray and stream fires will depend on the 
The spray fire is expected rate of fuel release a= the aircraft speed. 
to impact the aircraft, while the stream fire will impact the crash site. 
Accordingly, the relative importance of these two fires will depend 
greatly on local conditions. 
5.4 CATASTROPHIC CRASH 
The final scenario considers a very severe crash resulting in an 
instantaneous release of all the fuel tanks' contents. Such a release 
is possitle if the Pircraft impacts, for example, a mountain or falls to 
the ground because of complete loss of power. In such cases, the hazard 
to the passengers mag be more from the sechanical impact rather than from 
the subsequent fire. 
is for people and structures in the area surrounding the crash site. 
Therefore, the concern in the above release scenario 
When an aircraft rams into a mountain or the ground, the impact 
energy causes the aircraft structures to deform. The fuel tanks may be 
compressed in such an accident, resulting in the rapid squirting of all 
of the fuel into che atmosphere, essentially in the form of a fine spray. 
Clearly, hydraulic ramming also contributes to the formation of this 
spray. 
The impact energy also provides the ignition source for the spray. 
The spray bums in a fireball whose size and rate of rise can be calculated 
using existing fireball models. (5.7, 5.8) 
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I n  t h i s  scenario,  the energy release rate may be s u f f i c i e n t l y  
high t o  produce a b l a s t  wave with damaging overpressures a t  d i s t a n c e s  
away from the crash site. The b l a s t  wave c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  can bes t  be 
modeled by a TNT-equivalent approach. (5*20) 
success fu l  i n  predict ing f a r - f i e ld  e f f e c t s  which is t he  region of most 
i n t e r e s t  t o  bound the ex ten t  of t he  damage area. 
This approach is p a r t i c u l a r l y  
Over the years,  TNT y i e l d  f a c t o r s  have been estimated f o r  acc iden ta l  
explosions. This is done by es t imat ing the  amount of f u e l  re leased and 
the  s t r eng th  of the  b l a s t  from the observed damage. Clear ly  such esti- 
mates are sub jec t  t o  l a r g e  unce r t a in t i e s .  S t i l l ,  they provide t h e  b e s t  
i nd ica t ion  of what happens i n  real l i f e .  
(5.21) of Table 5.1 summarizes probably the  most complete l i s t i n g  
major, well-documented inc iden t s  involving vapor cloud explosions t h a t  
has been compiled t o  date .  
mates of t h e  amount of flammable gas o r  l i q u i d  released,  the TNT equi- 
Each l i n e  en t ry  i n  Table 5.1 includes esti- 
va l en t  charge, and the  y i e l d  factor .  
below one percent f o r  half  of the inc iden t s  and below 10 percent f o r  17 
of t h e  22 incidents .  
percent covering three orders  of magnitude. Much of t h i s  v a r i a b i l i t y  
may be due t o  t h e  volume of f u e l  i n  the  vapor cloud which a c t u a l l y  is 
i n  t he  flammable range. 
Note that the  y i e l d  f a c t o r  is 
S t i l l  t he  e n t i r e  range of y i e l d s  is  0.06 t o  65 
I n  addi t ion,  w e  present i n  Table 5.2 a second compilation of TNT 
y i e l d  f a c t o r s  reported i n  t h e  literature. 
provides general  recommended values  based onreviews of research tests, 
t h e o r i e s  and the acc iden ta l  d a t a  presented i n  Table 5.1. 
vides  the d a t a  reported f o r  hydroger, only. 
d a t a  is a l s o  very broad. 
Section A of Table 5.2 
Section B pro- 
Note t h a t  t he  range of y i e l d  
Based on Table 5.1 and 5.2, i t  is  evident that t h e  y i e l d  can vary 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y  depending on the s p e c i f i c  condi t ions of the release and 
t h e  explosion. Furthermore, the a v a i l a b l e  da t a  is not  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  
d i f f e r e n t i a t e  with confidence between the four  f u e l s  of interest t o  
t h i s  program. 
Arthur D Littlelnc 
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The y ie ld  f a c t o r  can be though of as the  product of two f r a c t i o n s  
n and n2: 
where 
1 
= t h e  f r a c t i o n  of t h e  t o t a l  f u e l  release t t a t  is ql 
w i t h i n  t h e  flammable range. This f r a c t i o n  depends 
on th.e f u e l  p r o p e r t i e s  and the  release cond i t ions  
which a f f e c t  t h e  evaporat ion and mixing of t h e  f u e l  
and air; and on t h e  width O E  t h e  flammable range; and 
n2 = . t h e  fraction of t h e  lower hea t  of combustion (of 
t h e  f u e l  i n  t h e  flanrmable range) t h a t  is t r ansmi t t ed  
t o  t h e  b l a s t .  
Since nl can vary depending on the release and combustion condi t ions,  
a whole range of y i e l d  f a c t o r s  is expected f o r  the same fuel .  
explains  t h e  l a r g e  v a r i a t i o n s  observed i n  Tables 5.1 and 5.2. 
This 
The g r e a t e s t  v a r i a b i l i t y  from scenario t o  scenario is expected i n  
the value o f n  
However, values  f o r  q2, the  f r a c t i o n  of the heat of combustion that is 
ava i l ab le  as blast energy, can be estimated on a comparative b a s i s  
f o r  t he  f u e l s  of i n t e r e s t  i f  w e  assume t h a t  an i d e a l  Chapman-Jouquet 
detonation occurs. 
which is highly dependent on the  release conditions.  1' 
Thus, following Eichler and Napadensky, ( 5  ' 24) t he  a v a i l a b l e  
hydrodynamic energy per u n i t  mass of mixture can be computed as: 
% = w + E K E - E D  
where 
Pdv = Expansion energy i' W =  
v 
CJ 
m .- %E t 1 / 2  U L  c j  Kine t i c  energy 
(5-1) 
5 1  
( 5 . 4 )  comprassion energy 
= 112 (pcj + Po) (vo - vc,) = Detonation 
where 
P = Pressure  
v = S p e c i f i c  volume 
u = Gas v e l o c i t y  
and t h e  s u b s c r i p t  o and c j  denote  t h e  I n i t i a l  Chapman-Jouguet de tona t ion  
condi t ions ,  respec t ive ly .  
This  formulation is use fu l  because i t  does not  depend on empi r i ca l  
d a t a  such as f i n a l  cloud s i z e  and can be r e a d i l y  computed s i n c e  the  
de tona t ion  state does not  vary as i t  propagates.  Assuming p e r f e c t  
gas behavior  of t h e  explosion products with cons tan t  s p e c i f i c  hea t  
r a t i o  (-0, and an i s e n t r o p i c  expansion, w e  have: 
7 
and, t h e r e f o r e ,  
P 
(Y-1) /Y 
The results are presented in Table 5.3 f o r  mixtures of h y d r o g t d  
air, methane/air  and gaso l ine / a i r  covering the  detonable range f o r  each 
fuel .  
percent f o r  H2) depending on the  f u e l  concentrat ion i n  t h e  cloud. 
Furthermore, % var iea  from f u e l  t o  fue l .  
l i t t l e  between the  three f u e l s  and over t h e i r  detonable range (maxhum 
v a r i a t i o n  - 15 percent) .  
Note that f o r  each f u e l  5 can vary s u b s t a n t i a l l y  (up t o  80 
On t he  o ther  hand, o2 v a r i e s  
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I n  addi t ion,  our numerical r e s u l t s  show t h a t  t h e  terms and ED 
are each approximately equal  t o  20% of E and t h e i r  cont r ibu t ions  t o  
Equation (5.1) cancel out .  Thus, t he  ava i l ab le  hydrodynamic energy (%) 
is approximately equal t o  the  i s en t rop ic  work of expansion. 
is cons is ten t  with the  results of an independent t h e o r e t i c a l  ana lys i s  of 
(5.30) t he  b l a s t  wave from a pressurized sphere by Strehlow. 
H 
This f ind ing  
Because of t he  weak v a r i a t i o n  'LL rl t h e  above ana lys i s  does not  2' 
e s s e n t i a l l y  d i f f e r e n t i a t e  between t h e  b l a s t  hazard assoc ia ted  with t h e  
three  fue l s .  
y i e ld  f ac to r  f o r  w e l l  mixed vapor clouds. 
percent of the  lower heat  of combustion) is needed t o  c a l c u l a t e  a 
conservative upper bound on the  b l a s t .  It is In t e re s t ing  t o  note  t h a t  
the  highest  volume f o r  q i n  Table 5.3 i s  the  same as  t h e  highest  y ie ld  
reported by Gugan f o r  a propane acc ident  ( i n  Tab le  5.1), namely 65%. 
S t i l l ,  it provides an  upper bound on t h e  va lues  of the  
This upper bound (near 65 
2 
5.5 €?.URD SCENARIOS FOR COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
I n  the  preceding paragraphs, w e  described the  physical  processes 
t h a t  might take place a f t e r  a f u e l  release. 
processes are mutually exclusive.  
w i l l  preempt the  d ispers ion  of a vapor cloud. 
Clear ly ,  some of these  
For example, i g n i t i o n  upon impact 
Under crash accident  condi t ions involving l a rge  f u e l  releases, we 
be l ieve  t h a t  i g n i t i o n  is very l i k e l y .  This is due t o  the  presence of 
a number of p o t e n t i a l  i g n i t i o n  sources such as the  engine and its hot  
su r faces ,  the  hot  brakes,  the  sparks  and hot  sur faces  produced by f r i c -  
t i o n  during impact and the  poss ib le  exposure and shor t ing  of electrical  
cables.  
Thus, w e  do not belie..-.  a comparison between f u e l s  with respec t  
t o  vapor dispers ion and subsequent delayed i g n i t i o n  I s  necessary. 
While delayed i g n i t i o n  is a p o s s i b i l i t y  f o r  smaller f u e l  releases, 
downwind dispers ion hazard zones f o r  such s p i l l s  a r e  not  very g rea t .  
Furthermore, there  is much uncertainty a t  present  i n  ava i l ab le  d isper -  
s ion  models fo r  LCH4 s p i l l s  and even more uncer ta in ty  i n  models f o r  
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Lt12 vapor dispers ion.  
un t i l  more experimental s p i l l  tests are conducted t o  allow improvement 
o r  v e r i f i c a t i o n  of e x i s t i n g  models. 
Thus, comparisons will  be u n r e l i a b l e  i n  any case 
The uncertainty i n  p red ic t ing  dispers ion behavior c a r r i e s  over t o  
LIIC prohlcm of predict Iu): potcllt i;ll Iliast cFftacts 111 trl~1:oafillt~ll (It- 
p a r t i a l l y  conlincd fuel vapor cloud.;. l'l~e amount of  fiir.1 i n  t l w  flammable 
range i n  a particular accident  scenario is highly dependent  on the 
release conditions and p o s e r e l e a s e  dispersion. The  v a r i a b i l i t y  i n  
these f a c t o r s  are so grea t  t h a t  they would over-ride FucI-specific 
f ac to r s .  
Thus, t h e  remaining s i g n i f i c a n t  scenarios  where comparisons among 
LCH and JAF can be made, involve pool f i r e s  (from e i t h e r  continuous m29 4 
o r  instantaneous releases of f u e l )  and f i r e b a l l s  which are associated 
with ca t a s t roph ic  crashes. 
i n  more d e t a i l .  
The next two s e c t i o n s  address these  e f f e c t s  
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6. FIREBALL HAZARDS 
Under the  ca tas t rophic  crash scenar io  (No. 41, we cocsider  a very 
severe accident  such as m i d - a i r ' c d l i s i o n  o r  an a i r c r a f t  impacting 
a mountain o r  f a l l i n g  prec ip i tous ly  t o  ground (due t o  l o s s  of power). 
Under these  condi t ions,  t h e  impact energy causes the  a i r c r a f t  s t r u c t u r e  
t o  deform. The f u e l  tanks may be compressed, r e s u l t i n g  i n  t h e  rapid 
s q u i r t i n g  of a l l  of t h e  f u e l  i n t o  the  atmosphere, e s s e n t i a l l y  i n  the  
form of a f i n e  spray. 
formation of t h i s  sp ray .  
source f o r  t he  spray. 
rises i n  t h e  sky. 
C l e a r l y ,  hydraul ic  ramming a l s o  cont r ibu tes  t o  the  
The impact energy a l s o  provides t h e  i g n i t i o n  
The spray burns i n  a f i r e b a l l  t h a t  expands as i t  
In t h i s  sec t ion ,  we quant i fy  the  thermal hazards from such f i r e b a l l s  
t o  people i n  the  v i c in i ty ,  of the  accident  loca t ion  such as bystanders,  o r  
emergency crew. 
ca tas t rophic  crash).  F i r s t ,  we present  a simple model t o  determine the  
f i r e b a l l  s i z e ,  durat ion and rise above ground. Secondly, we review the  
pe r t inen t  thermal r ad ia t ion  da ta  reported i n  the  l i t e r a t u r e  and develop 
r ad ia t ion  models fo r  LH2, LCH4 and j e t  f u e l  f i r e s .  
the  r ad ia t ion  hazard zone surrounding a f i r e b a l l  fo r  a range of f u e l  
release volumes. 
(The passengers can be assumed not t o  survive such a 
F ina l ,  w e  estimate 
6.1 FIREBALL MODEL 
F i r e b a l l s  have been s tudied  experimentally by a number of in- 
ves t  iga tor  s. 
of fue l ,  ign i ted  i t  and measured the  f i r e b a l l  diameter and duration. 
Their r e s u l t s  have a l l  yielded r e l a t ionsh ips  of the  following form: 
6*1 to 6*4)  They released var ious types and amounts 
Diameter = C1 (Mass)" 
F i r e  Duration = C2 (Mass) In 
Where n 0 113 
m p 116 to  113 
and the  C's are constants.  
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Of these references , only Fay (6g3) presented a t h e o r e t i c a l  ana lys i s  
t h a t  can be used t o  examine the  e f f e c t s  of t he  thermodynamic aqd combustion 
p rope r t i e s  of the  f u e l s  under consideration. 
summarized below and appl ied t o  the  condi t ions of t h i s  study. 
His model w i l l  be b r i e f l y  
Fay assumed t h a t  the  f i r e b a l l  behaves as an unsteady, s e l f - s imi l a r ,  
tu rbulen t ,  d i f fus ion  flame* 
with t h e  released f u e l ,  promoting combustion which u l t imate ly  consumes 
the  i n i t i a l  f u e l  charge (See Figure 6.1) 
Buoyancy forces  induce mixinn of ambient a i r  
Using the  equations of conser-at ion of mass and momemtum, a simple 
entrainment model and t h e  assumption of i d e a l  gas,  he determined the  gross  
flame c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  within two empir ical  cons t ra in ts :  B = en t r ahmen t  
coe f f i c i en t  (= 0.3) and 8 = equivalence r a t i o .  
The maximum height  of t h e  f i r e b a l l  is: 
According t o  h i s  model: 
113 z =  1 [g) 
'l'he m a x i m u m  f i r e  diameter is: 
D = 282 
The f i r e  durat ion is: 
and t he  f i n a l  f i r e b a l l  volume is: 
(6.3) 
57 
Arthur D Little Irm 
h t  rained 
/' 
Air 
\ 
I \ I \ I 
I 2 
I 
\ 
\ 
FIGURE 6.1: FIREBALL MODEL 
58 
Where 0 = densi ty  
8 = accelerat ion of gravi ty  
n,m = numbera sf atoms i n  a C H hydrocarbon n m  
T = temperature 
and the subsc r ip t s  a, p,  r ,  f denote a i r ,  products of combustion, reac- 
t a n t s  and gaseous f u e l ,  respect ively.  
It I s  noteworthy t h a t  t h i s  model p r e d i c t s  the func t iona l  r e l a t ion -  
sh ips  determined experimentally (Eqs. (6.1) and (6.2) .) Assuming a 
stoichometric mixture (@=1), we applied t h i s  model t o  LH2, LCH4 and 
conventional f u e l  releases. The r e s u l t s  are shown parametr ical ly  i n  
Figure 6.2 f o r  a range of l i q u i d  volume releases (V,) corresponding t o  
varioua f u e l  loadings i n  the a i r c r a f t  a t  the time of t he  accident .  
t h a t  as VI1 increases:  
Furthermore, LH2 f i r e b a l l s  are smaller,  of shor t e r  durdtion and lower 
rise height than those of hydrocarbon fue l s .  This r e s u l t  can be at- 
t r i bu ted  t o  the need f o r  a smaller volume of entrained combustion a I 
f o r  LH2, than f o r  hydrocarbon f u e l s  of equivalent chemical energy. 
* 
Note 
D, 2 and t a l l  increase which is reasonable. 
6. ' THERMAL RADIATION MODELS 
Li t t le  thermal r ad ia t ion  da ta  have been obtained d i r e c t l y  f o r  
f i r e b a l l s  ('*' - 6 * 4 )  However, numerous d a t a  have been obtained f o r  s teady,  
turbulent ,  buoyancy-driven d i f fus ion  flames over pool f i r e s .  Since a f i r e -  
b a l l  can be considered t h e  unsteady analogue of a pool f i r e ,  we can assume 
tha t  t he  r ad ia t ion  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of t h e  two flames are similar. 
A comprehensive compilation of t h e  r ad ia t ion  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of 
turbulent  d i f fus ion  flames f o r  l a rge  scale f i res  are given i n  Table 6.1. 
For each source we give a br i e f  desc r ip t ion  of the experiment, t he  
f i re  diameter, the f u e l  used, the r ad ia t ion  temperature, t h e  emissive- 
power ( E ) ,  t h e  f r a c t i o n  of t h e  lower heat of combustion t h a t  is r ad ia t ed  (n), 
the e x t i n c t i o n  c o e f f i c i e n t  (K)  and our comments on the work. The ranges 
of the values reported i n  Table 6.1 a r e  summarized i n  Table 6.2, whicht 
a l s o  gives  the  values used i n  our ca l cu la t ions .  
* 
The model is too crude t o  d i s t ingn i sh  between gasol ine aiid kerosene. 
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TABLE 6.1 
SUHMARY OF THERMAL RADIATION DATA FOR TURBULENT DIFFUSION FLAMES 
L.borarorr 1 flcld cwts on pool 
fins and finball#.  
F i e l d  LC~U La dlbas .  
s-so 
l4.6-2b 
1.621 
O.@lS-O.S 
:.6-l5.2 
‘% 
-4 
8.6 - 15.1 
&--SO 12.1 - 27.1 
19.2 
LBO 19.9 - 2S.1 
9.5 - 30 
10.1 - 23.7. 
30.0 - u) 
2.0 
2.6 
0. b9 
1.9-1 
3 
UMrtaincy o u M . r  f l r r  
y.. sIr)r la r d l o r c s r  
fl.ld O f  .leu. 
17 - 25 
23 - I3 
=> 
. I  
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As noted in Table 6.2, the character of the emitted.radiation is 
It is mainly black body radiation for different for the four fuels. 
gasoline and kerosene, emission in the H20 band for 151, and emission by H20, 
CO, and soot for LCH4. 
gasoline/kerosene and an H,O band model for LH2, respectively. 
computed theemissivityof the H2 flame using Hottel's mean beam length 
method and emissivity charts 
Accordingly, we used a black body model for 
L 
We 
( 6 . 5 ) .  
The development of a 2-band and soot model for the CH4 flame was 
Accordingly, we assumed the 
not warranted due to lack of spectral emission data and of an acceptable 
model for predicting soot concentrations. 
flame to be grey as suggested by the results of the large scale AGA test 
(6.11). 
We also used their measured value of the extinction coefficient. 
We believe this analysis to be adequate for the purpose of our compara- 
tive analysis of LH2 with other fuels. 
complex radiation model for a CH4 flame is recommended for future work. 
The development of a more 
The maximum flux (~"(x)) at any point (x) at grade is computed from: 
8" (x) = EEF T 
Where E = flame emissivity 
F = view factor between point x and the fireball 
(6.7) 
, (See Figure 6.1) P D2 2 +  22 
X 
and T = atmospheric transmissivity in the wavelengths emitted 
by the flame. 
It has been noted that for large heavy hydrocarbon (such as 
gasoline or kerosene) ?ool*fires, an outer layer of cold soot is 
produced. 
inner regions of the fire. 
is too short (% up to 128) to permit the formation of such a layer. 
Accordingly, it i p  not considered in the analysis. 
This may attenuate the radiation emitted by the hotter 
We believe that the duration of fireballs 
r 
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6.3 HAZARD ZONE AROUND FIREBALLS 
Using the  f i r e b a l l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  determined i n  Sect ion 6.1 and 
the  thermal r ad ia t ion  model/data of Sect ion 6 . 2 ,  w e  estimated the  
r ad ia t ion  f i e l d  surrounding f i r e b a l l s  (assuming 50% ambient r e l a t i v e  
humidity) of d i f f e r e n t  f u e l s  and release volumes. 
5 kw/m over the 
sho r t  dura t ions  of f i r e b a l l s ,  we made a conservative estimate of the  
d is tance  a t  grade where t h i s  f l ux  may be exceeded. The r e s u l t s  are 
given i n  Figures 6.3 and 6.4  as a funct ion of the volume and energy 
content of t he  re leased fue l ,  respect ively.  Note that the  hazard 
d is tance  is least f o r  LH2 and most f o r  LCH 
Using a f lux  of 
2 * 
as the  minimum required for thermal in jury  of s k i n  
4' 
* 
This value is spec i f ied  i n  the LNG f ede ra l  code (DOT-193). 
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7. POOL FIRE HAZARDS 
7 . 1  INTRODUCTION 
As discussed i n  Section 5 ,  pool f i r e s  are the  m o s t  l i k e l y  hazard of 
concern under a i r c r a f t  crash condi t ions.  
accident  scenar ios  defined i n  Sect ions 4 (no. 1, 2 and 3). For scenario 
1 ( a  small l eak ) ,  a small, quasi-steady, c i r c u l a r  pool f i r e  will be produced 
and w i l l  bum as long as the  .,.lease continues.  For scenar io  2 (a 
massive leak  with a i r c r a f t  a t  rest), a t r a n s i e n t ,  expanding c i r c u l a r  
pool f i r e  w i l l  be produced and w i l l  bum u n t i l  t h e  re leased f u e l  is 
cmsumed. For scenario 3, ( a  massive release with a i r c r a f t  dece lera t ing)  
the shape of the produced pool f i r e  w i l l  dapend on the  a i r c r a f t  speed 
and path before  stopping. 
They can r e s u l t  i n  t h ree  of t he  
In  a l l  cases, the hazard of concern is t he  engulfment of t h e  a i r c r a f t  
by the  pool f i r e  and the  associated thermal r ad ia t ion  t o  t h e  a i r c r a f t  skin.  
(For the  f i r e  s i z e s  of i n t e r e s t ,  thermal r ad ia t ion  is much more important 
than convection o r  conduction). Scenario 3 is of least concern s ince  
the a i r c r a f t  moves away from the burning f u e l ,  unless  a s i g n i f i c a n t  por- 
t i o n  of t h e  f u e l  is released after the  a i r c r a f t  has reached a coniplete 
s top .  In the later case,  scenario 3 is reduced t o  scenar io  2 o r  1. 
In t h i s  s ec t ion ,  w e  w i l l  d i scuss  the case of instantaneous release 
h e  models u t i l i z e d  i n  the  analyses  
Accordingly, we present  
and continuous release pool f i r e s .  
are f a i r l y  complex and vary from f u e l  t o  fue l .  
them separa te ly  i n  Appendix C and l i m i t  t h i s  s ec t ion  t o  a concise 
discussion of t he  resul ts .  
For each f u e l  and type of release, w e  charac te r ize  the  f i r r  s i z e  
and durat ion,  the  flame emissivi ty  and t h e  heat  f l ux  o r  heat  dcse t o  the  
a i r c r a f t  sk in .  Such a charac te r iza t ion  is s u f f i c i e n t  f o r  i h e  compara- 
t i v e  crash f i re  hazard ana lys i s  intended i n  t h i s  p ro jec t .  
used t o  determine the thermal response of t he  a i r c r a f t  s t r u c t u r e  when 
s u f f i c i e n t  information on the  a i r c r a f t  geometry and construct ion 
materials become ava i lab le .  This is recommended f o r  fu tu re  work t o  
determine t h e  absolute  l eve l  of hazard assoc ia ted  with each fue l .  
It  can a l s o  be 
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7.2 SCF n 2 OR '3) 
In  t h i s  s ec t ion ,  we  assume t h a t  various amc;unts of  f u e l  are released 
depending on the  number of ruptured tanks and on t h e i r  f u e l  loading a t  
the  time of t he  acc ident .  The release is assumed t o  be instantaneous 
( i .e. ,  i n  a few seconds). Slower release are discussed i n  Sect ion 7.2 .  
Using the  models and da ta  on pool f i r e s  discussed i n  Appendix C 
and the  LH, r ad ia t ion  model presented i n  Section 6.2,  we ca l cu la t ed  the  
main c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of  pool fires of i n t e r e s t .  These c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  
are given i n  Figures 7.1 and 7.2 which show f o r  var ious amounts of f u e l  
release, the  time-averaged pool f i r e  diameter (D) , height (HI, 
emiss iv i ty  (Ew) and heat f l u x  emitted from the  flame(qf);  the f i r e  
durat ion;  and the  heat dose t o  t h e  a i r c r a f t  s k i n  (q " i  q f  . f i r e  durat ion 
Note t h a t  H ,  I), E , q f  and q increase with increase i n  l i q u i d  volume 
release; while H / D  decreases and the  f rac t io i i  r ad ia t ed  ( f )  is nea r ly  
constant.  These t rends  are a l l  reasonable,  thus supporting t h e  v a l i d i t y  
of our  model. 
L 
. 11 
. 11 * 
. *I 1 
Should t h e i r  be an atmospheric wind, a t  the  time of the  f i r e ,  t he  
flame would bend downwind. 
t he  a i r c r a f t  sk in .  Accordingly, w e  focussed our analvses on the  case of 
ze ro  wind, t o  be conservative.  
This may reduce s l i g h t l v  the  heat t r a n s f e r  t o  
Similar  ca l cu la t ions  were conducted f o r  the  th ree  o the r  f u e l s .  
Comparisons among the  f u e l s  are shown i n  Figures 7.3 to  7.6 In  Figure 7.3, 
w e  show the computed f i r e  durat ion as a function of Volume released. 
t h a t  the  f i r e  durat ion increases  as the f u e l  volwne increases  and as the  f u e l  
v o l a t i l i t y  decreases,  which is reasonable.  
10 seconds, while the  o t h e r  f u e l  f i r e s  may last UP t o  2 minutes- 
Note 
LH2 burns o u t  i n  approximately 
~ * 
The heat f l u x  t o  the  top of the  a i r c r a f t  sk in  is equal t o  the  f lux  
emitted by the  flame because of t he  engulfment of t he  a i r c r a f t  i n  
t he  f i r e  ( i .e . ,  t he  view f a c t o r  = 1). 
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INSTANTANEOUS RELEASE OF THE FOUR FUELS 
FIGURE 7.6 
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In  Figure 7.4, w e  show the time-averaged f i r e  sizes (pool 
diameter and flame height)  correspoiiding t o  var ious f u e l  release 
volum=s indicatedby symbols i n  Figure 7.4. Note t h a t  f o r  a given 
volume release, the pool f i r e  of LH2 is s i g n i f i c a n t l y  narrower and 
taller than t h a t  of the o the r  f u e l s  ( t h i s  is due t o  t h e  much l a r g e r  
vaporizzt ion rate of LH2.) Furthermore, t h e  d i f f e rences  among t h e  
o the r  t h r e e  f u e l s  are not s i g n i f i c a n t .  
and 7.6 t h e  heat  aose ( 9 )  t o  t h e  a i r c r a f t  sk in  over t h e  f i r e  duration. 
Since the heat dose is  the product of t h e  time-averaged hea t  f l u x  and the  
f i r e  durat ion,  i t  combines the  e f f e c t  of f i r e  i n t e n s i t y  ard durat ion.  
The predicted result: is a s i g n i f i c a n t l y  lower q" f o r  LH2 than the o t h e r  
f u e l s  -- due mainly t o  the  s h o r t e r  f i r e  duration. This f inding holds 
when comparing e i t h e r  equal-liquid-volume releases (Figure 7.5) or 
equal-chemical-entqy releases (Figure 7.6). 
Fina l ly ,  w e  show i n  Figures 7.5 
II * 
7.3 CONTINUOUS RELEASE POOL FIRES (SCENARIO 1 or 3) 
I n  t h i s  s ec t ion ,  we consider small continuous, constant-rate 
releases covering t h e  ranges computed i n  Section 4. 
assumed t o  lhst on the  order of 1 t o  100 minutes, depending on the f lok  
rate. Immediate i g n i t i o n  r e s u l t s  i n  a pool f i r e  t h a t  engulfs  a s e c t i o n  
of the a i r c r a f t .  The f i r e  lasts as long as the release duration. The 
f i r e  may be steady or quasi-steady as described i n  Appendix C. 
The releases are 
Similar t o  the previous sec t ion ,  w e  computed the  pool diameters and 
f lame heights  as s h w n  i n  Figure 7.7. 
t yp ica l ly  smaller and taller than those of t he  o the r  f u e l s  due t c  higher 
evaporation rates. Furthermore, t h e  d i f f e rences  between the o the r  f u e l s  
are not very s i g n i f i c a n t .  
instantaneous release pool f i r e s .  
Note t h a t  LH, f i r e s  are 
&. 
These r e s u l t s  are similar t o  those f o r  t h e  
In Figure 7.8, we show the emitted heat f l u  by the  flame f o r  t he  
four f u e l s  and f o r  h range of l i q u i d  release rates. 
* 
A t  the top of the a i r c r a f t  sk in ,  where tP  f l u x  is expected t o  be 
h ighes t .  
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Bs t he  fleme s ize  increases ,  w e  expcct the  emitted hea t  f l ux  f i r s t  t o  IncrePse 
and then becomes constant  when the  flame is o p t i c a l l y  thick.  
i n fe r r ed  from Figure C . l  in Appendix C. 
cnrresponding f i re  s i zes  of Figure 7.8, t h e  o p t i c a l l y  t h i c k  l i m i t  is: 
This can be 
For t h e  range 06 flw rates and 
- not  reached f o r  LH2 
- reached only a t  l a rge  flow rates f o r  L”‘ 
- reached throughout f o r  gasoline/kerosene 
4 
Furthermore, small hydrogen fires esit l i t t l e  r ad ia t ion  compared LO t he  
o ther  fue ls .  
i n  t he  flame emiss iv i ty  and the  higher flame temperature. 
are obtained when compared on +he basis of equivalent-chemical-enerov- 
release r a t e s  (see Figure 7 . 5 ) .  
However, l a rge  f i r e s  could emit more due t o  the  increase  
Similar  r e s u l t s  
On t h e  q u a l i t a t i v e  s i d e ,  the  r e su l t .  are cons is ten t  with our 
i n t u i t i v e  expectat ions.  On the  quan t i t a t ive  s i d e ,  the  heat  f l ux  from 
LH 
gasol ine o r  kerosene; while it is lower than t h a t  from LCH4. 
continuous-release pool f i r e s  can be a t  worst c a n p a r a d e  t o  t h a t  from 2 
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8 .  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
I n  t h i s  s tudy,  w e  compared crash f i r e  hazards of mission equivalent ,  
400 passenger, Mach 0.85,  5500 n. m i l e  range a i r c r a f t  f o r  th ree  types 
of fue l .  These f u e l s  were l i q u i d  hydrogen, l i qu id  methane, and conven- 
t i o n a l  j e t  fue l .  The two cryogenic-fueled designs had tanks located i n  
:he fuselage; t he  conventional f u e l  a i r c r a f t  had wing f u e l  'sanks. 
t h e  designs were based on published Lockheed s tud ie s .  
A l l  
For purposes of comparison, w e  considered four  crash scenar ios  
ranging from minor releases t o  a ca tas t rophic  crash.  
t h e  po ten t i a l  fuel-release and crash f i r e  consequences were compared f o r  
t he  three  types of fue l s .  
I n  each scenar io ,  
Our bas ic  conclusion is t h a t  t he  crash f i r e  hazards are not  s ign i -  
f i c a n t l y  d i f f e r e n t  when compared i n  general  fo r  the  th ree  fue l s ,  although 
some f u e l s  showed minor advantages f n  one respect  o r  another.  Spec i f i ca l ly ;  
0 For f i r e b a l l  posc crash scenarios ,  LH showed r e l a t i v e l y  lower 2 
hazard zones a t  grade than d id  conventional f u e l s  and LCH4 
( i n  tha t  o rder ) .  This e f f e c t  is apparent whether t he  comparison 
is made on the  bas i s  of t o t a l  f u e l  volume released o r  on the  
bas i s  of equivalent chemical energy content of t h e  f u e l  re- 
leased. T n i s  is due to  the  rapid burning of t h e  hydrogen, the  
smaller f - r e b a l l  s i z e ,  and the  lower emiss iv i tv  of t b e  hvdrogen 
flame. 
a For f u e l  releases r e s u l t i n g  i n  pool f i r e s ,  LH 
smaller hazard zones than t h e  o ther  fue l s ,  on e i t h e r  a volume 
o r  energy content comparative bas i s  except for t he  l a r g e s t  
s p i l l  s i z e s  where the hazard zone may be s l i g h t l y  higher 
than t h a t  f o r  conventional f u e l  - but s t i l l  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  less 
than t h a t  f o r  LCH4. 
quickly,  has a srrjller diameter (although ta l ler)  flame and 
a lesser emissive power except a t  very l a rge  s p i l l  s i z e s .  
a l s o  produces 
2 
Again, t h e  LH2 f i r e  burns out very 
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Dispersing aerosol  is po ten t i a l ly  a problem f o r  a l l  t h ree  fue ls .  
Aerosol formation was not  t r e a t e d  cmpara t ive ly  because it  is 
so dependent on t h e  s p e c i f i c s  of p a r t i c u l a r  crash conditions.  
0 For the  two cryogenic fue l s ,  downwind d ispers ion  of vapors 
from unignited f u e l  s p i l l s  is a poten t ia l  problem. One might 
expect LCH4 t o  be more l i k e l y  t o  d isperse  downwind near  grade; 
LH4 might be more l i k e l y  t o  rise. 
formation, both d ispers ing  clouds could remain near  grade. 
However, wi th  aerosol  
0 Because of the wider flammabili ty l i m i t s ,  more f u e l  is l i k e l y  
t o  be flammable a t  any time i n  a d ispers ing  LH2 vapor cloud 
than i n  an equivalent LCH vapor cloud. However, t h i s  rncreases  4 
t h e  chance of e a r l i e r  i g n i t i o n  i n  a d ispers ing  LH 
may reduce the  ex ten t  of downwind vapor f i r e  damage. 
cloud and 2 
0 Smaller s p i l l s  of LH2 and LCH4 are l i k e l y  tr’ disperse  as 
neu t r a l ly  buoyant plumes. 
Considerable uncer ta in ty  ex is t s  i n  pred ic t ion  of doanwind 
d ispers ion  d is tances  f o r  l a rge  LCH4 s p i l l s  because of l imi ted  
experimental d a t a  and the  complexity of t he  physical  e f f e c t s  
involved i n  developing a t h e o r e t i c a l  model. 
are ava i l ab le  f o r  LH s p i l l s .  
Far  less da ta  
2 
I n  severe crashes,  f i r e  is so l i k e l y  t h a t  t h e o r e t i c a l  
flammable vapor d ispers ion  with delayed i g n i t i o n  is not con- 
s idered a c red ib l e  t h r e a t  h t  l a rge  d is tances  from the  crash.  
0 LH2 is more l i k e l y  t o  cause b l a s t  e f f e c t s  due t o  accumulation 
and ign i t ion  i n  confined srdces .  
by careful  design, monito:-ing, provision of iner:lng sys tems,  
and design with secondary b a r r i e r s  t o  contain small leaks.  
This problem can be minimized 
I n  summary, our comparative evaluat ion f o r  h i s t o r i c a l l y  observed 
crash damage scenar ios  appl ied t o  mission eq!tivalent a i rcraf t  shows 
t h a t  1,H 2 
rapidly.  
re la t ively minor and d i l i i c u l t  t c  quant i fy .  
o f f e r s  s u r v i v a b i l i t y  b e n e f i t s  i n  most cases  where a f i r e  occurs  
The advantages and disadvantages in o the r  respects are 
However, from a crash f i r e  
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hazard s tandpoint ,  LH2 does not  appear t o  be a s i g n i f i c a n t l y  more 
hazardous f u e l  than conventional jet  f u e l s  and LCH4. 
i t  o f f e r s  lesser hazards. 
ment work, w e  see no crash f i r e  hazard s i t u a t i o n s  which should discourage 
development of a LH2-fueled a i r c r a f t .  
In  some respec ts ,  
Thus, pending some f u t u r e  research and develop- 
From our evaluat ion,  w e  recommend t h a t  add i t iona l  s a f e t y  s t u d i e s  be 
performed t o  c l a r i f y  some of t h e  remaining u n c e r t a i n t i e s  ;e la t ing t o  
LH2 hazards. I n  pa r t i cu la r :  
0 Additional dispers ion and f i r e  tests would be des i r ab le  t o  
confirm t h e  conclusions drawn i n  t h i s  s tudy,  which are based 
on t h e  cur ren t  state-of-the-art .  For example, pool f i r e  tests 
with an instrumented fuselage can be conducted t o  tesc the  
v a l i d i t y  of our predic t ions  i n  Sect ion 7. 
0 Comparisons between fu tu re  LH2 tests and planned LCH4 (LNG) 
tests, under DOE sporsorship a t  Jackass F l a t s ,  Nevada, should 
be made. 
8 Second generat ion f i r e  and d ispers ion  models s h m l d  be developed, 
based on theory and r e s u l t s  of experiments. 
Further,  should the  development of a LH2 a i r c r a f t  proceed, some 
technological  improvements should be given p r i o r i t y ,  f o r  example: 
Further  s t u d i e s  to develop optimum design and sys tems f o r  LH2 
a i r c r a f t  are needed. 
considerat ion i n  design. 
Crashworthiness should be an important 
0 Since component r e l i a b i l i t y  is very important i n  preventing minor 
lenks with p o t e n t i a l  f o r  c r ea t ing  a se r ious  inc ident  o r  accident  
i n  a LH2 a i r c r a f t ,  a t t e n t i o n  should be focussed on f u r t h e r  develop- 
ment work on t h e  following components: 
- Less expensive pumps ($5,000 range) 
- Improved pump seals with a longer opera t ing  l i f e  (present  seals 
a re  designed f o r  only a few hours of operat ion)  
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- Evaluation of new types of fuel transfer systems to 
minimtze the change of any leakage (pump seals, valve 
packings , etc. 1 
- Improved lightweight and strong storage systems 
- Optimized LH2 combustors 
a 3  
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APPENDIX A 
DESCRIPTION OF AIRCRAFT FUEL SYSTEMS AND_ 
CALCULATIONS OF FUEL RELEASE RATES 
A. 1 IKTPODUCTION 
In t h i s  Appendix, we present  a desc r ip t ion  of t h e  t h r e e  f u e l  systems 
under study, and an estimate of t h e  f u e l  release rates f o r  each system 
and each accident scenario.  
The a i r c r a f t  considered are the th ree  mission-equivalent a i r c r a f t  
s e l ec t ed  f o r  ana lys i s  i n  Section 2 of the  main report .  
are fueled by LH2, LCH4 aad Jet A. (For t h e  purpose of t h e  f u e l  release 
ana lys i s ,  w e  need not d i f f e r e n t i a t e  between Jet A and gasol ine o r  JP-4.) 
These aircraft 
The accident  scenarios  considered are those described i n  Section 4. 
They cover a minor f u e l  release, a massive release with t h e  a i r c r a f t  at 
rest, a massive release with t h e  a i r c r a f t  in motion and a ca t a s t roph ic  
release. 
modes/ events such as v ib ra t ion ,  s t r a i n e d  maneuver, engine b u r s t ,  sheared 
engine pad, f a i l e d  thermal in su la t ion ,  sheared wing, broken fuselage and 
fragmented a i r c r a f t .  The f u e l  release rates were ca l cu la t ed  f o r  these 
f a i l u r e  modes/events. 
form i n  Table 4.3 of t h e  main report .  
These scenarios  have been associated with s p e c i f i c  f a i l u r e  
Theserates have already been presented i n  a summary 
A.2 LH, FUEL SYSTEM 
L 
A.2.1 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 
The LH2 a i r c r a f t  f u e l  system d e t a i l s  are taken from the  Lockheed 
Study(A'l)ior a 400 passenger a i r c r a f t  with a range of 5500 n a u t i c a l  miles  
operat ing a t  a c r u i s e  speed of Mach 0.85. 
TILYE 
The e x t e r i o r  configurat ion i d e n t i f i e d  above resembles a conventional 
subsonic jet passenger aircraft as shown i n  Figure A.l. The i n t e r i o r  con- 
f igu ra t ion ,  however, is s i g n i f i c a n t l y  d i f f e r e n t  i n  t h a t  t h e  f u e l  is s t o r e d  
within t h e  fuselage.  
located between t h e  f l i g h t  crew canpartment and the  passenger compartment; 
t h e  rear tank 5s located i n  the t a l l  s ec t ion  of t he  fuselage behind t h e  
Two f u e l  tanks are provided: t h e  forward tank is 
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passenger compartment as shown i n  Figure A.2. 
head dividing t h e  tank i n t o  two f u e l  compartment. 
t e g r a l  with the  fuselage and are insu la ted  with g l a s s  microspheres placed 
i n  an evacuated j acke t  around the  tank. 
1 t o  4 corresponding t o  the  engine t o  which it  normally suppl ies  f u e l .  
The l e f t  and r i g h t  inboard engines are numbered 2 and 3, respec t ive ly ;  
outboards are 1 and 4. 
Each tank has a c e n t r a l  bulk- 
The f u e l  tanks are in- * 
Each f u e l  tank is numbered from 
The a i r c r a f t  has a gross  f u e l  load of 56,460 pounds. 
d i s t r i b u t e d  equal ly  i n  the  four  f u e l  tanks a t  14,115 pounds each. 
two tanks are contained i n  one tanh envelope and interconnected, t h e  
complete f a i l u r e  of e i t h e r  t h e  forward o r  a f t  f u e l  s torage  w i l l  cont r ibu te  
up t o  a m a x i m u m  of 28,230 pounds of LH2 t o  the  hazard. 
BOOSTER PUMPS 
This i s  
Because 
Pumps are required t o  dc l iver  t he  f u e l  from t h e  tanks t o  the  engines 
i n  order  t o  meet the  Net Pos i t ive  Suction Head (NPSH) requirements of 
the high pressure engine pumps. 
located within the  tanks. Each of t he  four tanks contains  th ree  pumps of 
which two are powered during f l i g h t  operat ions a t  a l l  times from sepa ra t e  
power sources. 
flow of 0.774 lh/sec. and each is dr iven by a va r i ab le  speed motor t h a t  
is cont ro l led  by the  engine requirement. 
and flow can vary over a wide range. 
The pumps are of the  cen t r i fuga l  type 
Each pump has a design pressure rise of 45 p s i  a t  a mass 
Thus, t he  pump pressure rise 
LINES -
The booster pumps t r a n s f e r  t he  f u e l  from ihe  tanks t o  t h e i r  respec t ive  
engines through 1 inch diameter s t a i n l e s s  s teel  l i nes .  
thermally insulated with 1.5 inches of closed ce l l  polyurethane foam en- 
cased i n  an aluminum jacket. 
braided cover are used where l i n e  f l e x i b i l i t y  is required. 
The l i n e s  are 
Evacuated double bellow l i n e s  with an ou te r  
* 
In t eg ra l  ind ica tes  t h a t  the  c i r c u l a r  s ec t ions  of t h e  tank form a pa r t  of 
the fuselage s t r u c t u r e  and the re fc re  are designed t o  sus t a in  and transmit 
a l l  the  forces  developed i n  t h e  fuselage during the  mission. 
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The fue l ing  system is shown schematically i n  Figure A . 3  and its 
arrangement in t he  a i r c r a f t  is shown i n  Figure A.4. 
tank can be t r ans fe r r ed  t o  engines o ther  than its assigned engLie through 
a crossfeed valving arrangement located as ind ica ted  i n  Figure A.4,  Detail A. 
The f u e l  from any 
FILL, DRAIN AND VENT 
A l l  fue l ing ,  defuel ing and vent ing of t h e  f u e l  tanks is performed a t  
the  a i r c r a f t  t a i l .  
loca t ion  are mounted i n  a tunnel  over t he  fuselage a t  the  v e r t i c a l  center- 
l i n e ,  as shown i n  Fig.lre A - 5  (Detail E). The l i n e s  are vacuum Jacketed t o  
provide thermal insu la t ion .  
The l i n e s  f o r  these  operation: t o  the  tanks from t h i s  
A . 2 . 2  LH, PIPE LINE BREAK 
A cen t r i fuga l  type booster  pump located i n  t h e  LH2 tanks t r a n s f e r s  
L 
the  LH2 f u e l  t o  engines where i t  is pumped t o  the  combustion chamber 
pressure a t  a design flow of 0.77 lb/sec. 
l i n e  is c leanly  severed a t  the  outboard engines, the  discharged f u e l  w i l l  
flow a t  about 1.3 Ib lsec .  s i n g l e  phase l i qu id  flow based upon an equivalent  
l i n e  length of 300 f e e t .  
(severed a t  a point  c loser  t o  the  tank than the  outboard engines) can be 
estimated from the  following equation: 
I n  t h e  evenr t h a t  t h e  f u e l  
* 
The mass flow from a l i n e  of s h o r t e r  length 
(A. 1) 
Where : 
F1 is the  length f ac to r  i n  f r ac t ions  o t  300 f e e t .  
For example, a LH2 f u e l  l i n e  cleanly severed a t  t he  root  of t he  
wing has an estimated flow of 1.8 lb l sec . ,  assuming t h a t  the  l i n e  length 
is hal f  of the length t o  the  outboard engines. 
f u e l  l i n e s  pass through the  wing root  area. 
when a s i n g l e  wing is severed, is 3.6 lblsec., and f o r  two severed wings 
is 7.2 l b l sec .  
t o t a l  flow of 5 . 2  l b l sec . ,  1.3 lb l sec .  frnm each engine feed l i n e .  These 
values  are l i s t e d  in Table 4 . 3 ,  which summarizes the  f u e l  leak values  f o r  
t he  th ree  a i r c r a f t  and which w i l l  be discussed i n  Section 4- 
As shown i n  Figure A . 4 ,  t w o  
Thus, t he  expected flow, 
Loss of a l l  four  engine pods is estimated t o  produce a 
-. * 
The longest l i n e  length between tank and engine is estimated t o  be 150 f e e t .  
The equivalent length is assumed t o  be twice the  a c t u a l  l i n e  length o r  about 
300 f e e t  t o  account f o r  elbows and f i t t i n g s  i n  the  pressure-flow ca lcu la t ions .  
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The LHz flow of 1.3 lb /sec .  from a s ing le  severed l i n e  is t he  s teady 
state rate discharging d i r e c t l y  t o  the  atmosohere, which can a l s o  be used 
as t h e  I n i t i a l  discharge rate from the  l i n e  i n t o  the  a i r c r a f t  i n t e r i o r .  
This rate may decrease with time as the  pressure generated by the  vaporized 
LH2 i n  the  closed compartment increases  unless  t he re  is a s t r u c t u r a l  f a l i u r e  
i n  the  compartment walls causing it  t o  open t o  atmosphere. 
It should be noted t h a t  t he  f u e l  l i n e s  w i l l  be housed i n  w e l l  protected 
areas of the  fuselage and wing s t ruc tu re .  
of the  a i r c r a f t  w i l l  only occur i f  t he  s t r u c t u r e  is severely damaged o r  
Damage t o  them from ou t s ide  
. penetrated.  Thus, a break i n  the  f u e l  l i n e  w i l l  vent t o  the  atmosphere. 
However, when t h e  f u e l  l i n e s  are damaged by v ib ra t ion  and S t r u c t u r a l  
s t ra ins ,  f o r  example, they may discharge i n t o  t h e  i n t e r i o r  compartments of 
t he  a i r c r a f t .  Vaporization of LH within these compartments w i l l  p ressur ize  
them and can cause s t r u c t u r a l  damage. 
i g n i t i o n  sources i n  t'ie f a i l e d  compartments, a f i r e  is l i k e l y  t o  occur. 
2 
Further ,  with a i r  and p o t e n t i a l  
A.2.3 FUEL TANK LEAK 
An opening i n  t h e  tank wall w i l l  release l iqu id  t o  the  outs ide  o r  t o  
the  in s ide  depending on its loca t ion .  
p s i  u l lage  pressure ( r e l i e f  valve s e t t i n g ) .  A t  landing o r  take-off,  there  
is a d i f f e r e n t i a l  pressure from ins ide  t o  the  outs ide  of 8.3 p s i  max. 
opening i n  the  tank t o  t h e  outs ide ,  equivalcnt t o  the  flow area of the  
t r a n s f e r  l i n e s ,  w i l l  produce a flow of near ly  2 lb / sec .  A s  t h i s  flow 
is d i r e c t l y  proport ional  t o  t h e  a rea  of t he  opening, t he  flows f o r  l a rge r  
o r  smaller openings can be determined. 
tabulated below f o r  equivalent  diameters from 1 to  32 inches:  
These tanks are designed f o r  23 
An 
* 
Flows from l a r g e r  openings are 
Equivalent LH2 Discharge 
( in . )  ( lb / sec .  
1 2 
Opening Diameter Rate 
2 
4 
8 
16 
32 
8 
30 
130 
5 10 
2100 
*This neglec ts  t he  e f f e c t s  of grav i ty  head and i n e r t i a  on the  l i qu id .  
These e f f e c t s  a r e  small compared t o  t h e  u l lage  pressure.  
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An opening i n  t h e  tank end walls leading t o  t h e  spaces  i n s i d e  of  
t he  a i r c r a f t  sk in  can r e s u l t  i n  gas  generat ion and pressur iza t ion  of t h e  
spaces.  
passenger compartment. The forward end of  t h e  a f t  tank also l eads  t o  t h e  
passenger compartment; t h e  a f t  end leads  i n t o  t h e  t a i l  which remains vented 
a t  a l l  times t o  t h e  atmosphere. 
r e s u l t i n g  froiu l eaks  i n t o  these  spaces should be examined. 
hazard may be t h e  cold shocking of the  mechanical, electrical  and hydrau- 
l i c  components i n  these  areas which may induce o t h e r  f a i l u r e s .  
One end of forward tank leads  t o  t h e  cockpit  and the  o t h e r  t o  t h e  
The hazards t o  personnel and passengers 
A f u r t h e r  
A.3 LCH,. FUEL SYSTEM 
7 
A.3.1 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 
(A. 2;\ 
The LCH4 a i r c r a f t  f u e l  system are from the  Lockheed Study fo r  
a 4 0 0  passenger a i r c r a f t  with a range o f  5500 n a u t i c a l  miles opera t ing  
a t  a c ru i se  speed of Mach 0.85 .  
mission f o r  t h e  comparison LH 
TANKS 
This mission is i d e n t i c a l  t o  t h e  
a i r c r a f t .  2 
The e x t e r i o r  and i n t e r i o r  configurat ions of  t h e  LCH4 a i r c r a f t  are 
similar to  those of t h e  LH2 a i r c r a f t  shown i n  Figure A . l .  
a i r c r a f t  dirnensio:.s and f u e l  tank placement are shown i n  Figure A.6.  The 
forward f u e l  s to rage  is a non-integral  sphe r i ca l  tank with a fore-to-aft  
p a r t i t i o n  d iv id ing  the  f u e l  i n t o  two equal volumes. The tank is supported 
wi th in  the  fuselage i n  four  t runnions,  two on the v e r t i c a l  c e n t e r l i n e  (of 
t h e  tank and two on the  hor izonta l  cen te r l ine  (perpendicular t o  t h e  
f l i g h t  path) .  
of closed c e l l  polyurethane foam. 
fuselage.  
p a r t i t i o n  dividing i t  i n t o  two equal  f u e l  volumes. 
insu la ted  with 1.75 inches of c losed ce l l  polyurethane foam covered with 
a vapor b a r r i e r .  This,  i n  tu rn ,  is covered with a ni t rogen purged open 
ce l l  foam which supports  t he  a i r c r a f t  f a i r i n g .  
The I , C H 4  
The tank is thermally insu la ted  with a 2-inch thickness  
The a f t  f u e l  tank is i n t e g r a l  with t h e  
It has a t runcated conica l  shape, e l l i p s o i d  ends and a 
The tank is thermally 
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A.3.2 LQI,. FLTZL LINE BREAK 
A cen t r i fuga l  type booster  pump located i n  the  LCH4 f u e l  tanks 
In  the  event t h a t  
T 
t r a n s f e r s  t h e  L a 4  f u e l  t o  engines where i t  is pumped t o  the  combastion 
chamber pressure a t  a design flow of 2.26 lb / sec .  
t he  f u e l  l i n e  1s cleanly severed a t  the  outboard engines , the discharged 
f u e l  w i l l  flow a t  about 3.5 lb / sec .  s i n g l e  phase l i q u i d  flow based upon 
an equivalent l i n e  length The mass flow from the  l i n e  of 
s h o r t e r  length (severed a t  a point  c l o s e r  t o  the tank than the  outboard 
engines) can be estimated from the  following equation: 
* 
of 300 f e e t .  
Where : 
I 
F1 is the  length f ac to r  i n  f r a c t i o n s  of 300 f e e t .  
For example, a L a 4  f u e l  l i n e  c leanly  severed a t  the  root  of t he  
wing has an estimated flow of 5 l b l sec . ,  assuming t h a t  t h e  l i n e  length is 
half  of the  length t o  the  outboard engines. 
f u e l  l i n e s  pass through the  wing root  area. 
when a s i n g l e  wing is severed, i s  10 lb l sec . ,  and f o r  two severed wings 
is 20 lb l sec .  
As shown i n  Figure A . 7 ,  two 
Thus, the  expected flow, 
The LCH4 flow of 3.5 l b l sec .  from a s i n g l e  severed l i n e  is the  
steady s ta te  rate discharging d i r e c t l y  t o  t h e  atmosphere, which can also  
be used as the  i n i t i a l  discharge rate from t h e  l i n e  i n t o  the  a i r c r a f t  
i n t e r i o r .  
t be  vaporized LCH4 i n  the  closed compartment increases  
This rate may decrease with t i m L  as t h e  pressure generated by 
* 
The longest l i n e  length between tank and engine is estimated t o  be 150 
feet. "lie equivalent  length is assumed t o  be twice t h e  a c t u a l  l i n e  
length -: about 300 f e e t  €or  pressure-flow ca lcu la t ions .  
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The f u e l  l i n e s  of t h e  L a 4  a i r c r a f t ,  l i k e  those of t h e  LH2 a i r c r a f t ,  
wi1.1 be housed i n  w e l l  protected areas of tue fuselage and wing s t ruc tu re .  
Damage t o  them from outs ide  of the  a i r c r a f t  w i l l  only occur i f  t he  struc- 
tu re  is severely damaged o r  penetrated.  
w i l l  vent  t o  the  atmosphere. 
by v ibra t ion  and s t r u c t u r a l  strains, f o r  example, they may discharge 
i n t o  the  i n t e r i o r  compartments of the  aircraft. 
within these compartments w i l l  p ressur ize  them and can cause f u r t h e r  
s t r u c t u r a l  damage. Further,  with air  and p o t e n t i a l  i g n i t i o n  sources 
i n  the  f a i l e d  compartments, a f i r e  is l i k e l y  t o  occur. 
Thus, a break i n  the  f u e l  l i n e  
Howe**er, when t h e  f u e l  l i n e s  are damaged 
Vaporization of LCH4 
The flow from t w o  c leanly  sheared l i n e s  a t  t h e  wing root  is 
estimated at 10 lb/sec.  
is sheared from the  fuselage a f t e r  s t r ikinc.  an obstruct ion.  
four engine pods is estimated t o  produce a t o t a l  flow of 14 lbfsec . ,  
3.5 lb/sec.  from each engine feed l i ne .  
This f u e l  system f a i l u r e  r e s u l t s  when tSe wing 
Loss of a l l  
A.3.3 FUEL TANK LEAK 
An opening i n  t h e  a f t  f u e l  tank w a l l  w i l l  release l i q u i d  t o  the  
outs ide and possibly i n t o  the  i n t e r i o r  of t he  fuselage.  
tank, contained e n t i r e l y  wi th in  che fuselage,  w i l l  release f u e l  i n t o  the  
fuselage i n t e r i o r  when ruptured. 
ul lage pressure.  
from ins ide  t o  the  outs ide  of 6.3 p s i  max .  
The forward f u e l  
These tanks are designed f x  21 p s i  
A t  landing o r  take-off, t he re  is a d i f f e r e n t i a l  pressure 
The i n i t i a l  rate of dumped LCH4 w i l l  vary depending upon the  loca t i cn  
of the opening and the  f u e l  tank u l lage  pressure,  as w e l l  as pos i t i ve  "Grc 
forces  generated by the motion of the  a i r c r a f t .  
vary by design i n  normal operat ion between 18 and 21 psig.  Because the  
tank had a diameter of about 16 f e e t ,  t he  pressure a t  t h e  bottom ol t h e  
tank, due t o  the  static head of l i qu id ,  w i l l  vary from 0 t o  3 p s i  depending 
upon l iqu id  leve l .  
be less than 0-3 p s i .  
t o  allow for  & 1 "Gl' load f ac to r  induced by a p i tch ing  maneuver. 
the minimum and m a x i m u m  l i q u i d  pressures  developed across  an opening are 
0 and 12 p s i ,  respect ively,  depending on locat ion.  
The u l l age  pressure can 
A t  any o the r  loca t ion  on the  tank, t he  va r i a t ion  w i l l  
Another 0-3 p s i  must be added t o  the  l i qu id  pressure 
Thus, 
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Each fuel tank is numbered from 1 to 4, corresponding to the engine 
Figure A.7 shows the fuel feed system to which it normally aupplies fuel. 
for the L a 4  aircraft. 
The aircraft has a gross fuel load of 152,000 poundu. Thin ir 
distributed equally into four fuel tanks at 38,000 each. 
supply for two engines is carried in one tank envelop and interconnected, 
t1i.s failure of either the forward or aft fuel storage will contribute up 
to a maximum of 76,000 pounds of LCH4 to the hazard. 
BOOSTER PUMPS 
Because the fuel 
- 
Pumps are required to deliver the fuel from the tanks to the 
engines in order to meet the Net Positive Suction Head (NPSH) requirements 
of the high preasure engine pumps. 
located within the tanks. 
of which two are powered during flight operations at  all times from 
separate power sources. 
at o mass flow of 2.26 lb/sec. 
The pumps are of the centrifugal type 
Each of the four tanks contains three pumps 
Each pump has a design pressurr rise of 30 psi 
LINKS 
The booster pumps transfer the fuel from the tanks to their 
respective engines through 1.2 inch diameter stainless steel lines. 
The lines arc thermnlly insulated with 1.5 inches of closed cell foam 
encased in an aluminum jacket. Evacuated double bellow lines with an 
outer braided cover are used where line flexibility is required. 
The fueling system is shown schematically in Figure A.7  and its 
2 arrangemat in the aircraft is similar to FigurPS A.4 and A . 5  for the 1H 
aircraft. 
its aaisi$ned engine through a cross-feed valving arrangement located as 
indicated in Figure A . 4 ,  Detail A. 
The fuel from any tank can 3c transferred to engines othcr than 
FILL, DRAIN AND VENT 
All fueling, defueling and venting of the fuel tanks is performed 
at the aircraft tail. The liner for these operations to the tanks from 
this location are mounted in a tunnrl over the fuselage at the vertical 
centerline, rimilar to that shown in Figure A . 5 .  for the UI, aircraft. - 
103 
Arthur I> I~ttlc Inc 
An opening i n  the a f t  tank t o  the  outs ide  eal . ivalent t o  t h e  flow 
area of  t he  t r a n s f e r  l i n e s  w i l l  produce a r ~ o w  of near ly  7.5 lb/sec.  A s  
t h i s  flow i p  d i r e c t l y  proport ional  t o  the  area of t he  opening, the  flows 
f o r  l a r g e r  o r  smaller openings can be determined. 
openings are tabulated below f o r  equivalent diameters from 1.2 t o  32 inches: 
Flcws from l a r g e r  
Equivalent LCH4 Discharge 
Opening Diameter Rate 
( i n )  
1.2 
2 
4 
8 
16 
32 
( lb/sec)  
7.5 
21  
83 
330 
1300 
5300 
An opening i n  end walls of e i t h e r  tank leading t o  t h e  spaces  
in s ide  of the  fuselage can r e s u l t  i n  gas generat ion and pressur iza t ion  of 
the  spaces. A f u r t h e r  hazard may be the  cold shocking of t h e  mechanical, 
e l e c t r i c a l  and hydraulic components i n  these areas which may induce o ther  
f a i l u r e s .  
A.4 JET A FUEL SYSTEM 
A.4.l SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 
The Jet A a i r c r a f t  f u e l  system d e t a i l s  are obtained from Lockheed (A.2,  3) 
for  a 400 passenger a i r c r a f t  with a range of 5500 nau t i ca l  miles operat ing 
at a c r u i s e  speed of Mach 0.85. 
TANKS 
The e x t e r i o r  configurat ion of t he  Jet A a i r c r a f t  is similar t o  t h a t  
of the  LHz a i r c r a f t  shown i n  FigureA.l .  
s imi l a r  t o  conventional subsonic commercial j e t  a i r c r a f t .  
configurat ion is fo r  two tanks i n  each wing, each containing about 
35,000 pounds of f u e l ,  and f o r  two center  tanks,  each containing about 
24,000 pounds of fue l ,  f o r  a t o t a l  f u e l  load of 183,000 pounds. 
The f u e l  s torage  is i n  the  wings, 
The probable 
The tank configurat ion is s i m i l a r  t o  t h a t  shown i n  FigureA.8, even 
though i t  is f o r  the L-1011-500 three-engine passenger t ranspor t .  
l i n e  s izes  and t h e i r  expos. re outs ide  of the  heavily protected s t r u c t u r e  
are considered representa t ive  of t he  Jet A a i r c r a f t .  
The 
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BOOSTER PUMPS 
It is expected t h a t  each of t h e  four  wing tanks w i l l  contain two 
booster  pumps, e i t h e r  of which can meet the  f u e l  rate requirements of 
t h e  assigned engine. 
and have a capaci ty  of about 20 pounds per second. 
These pumps are of t he  p o s i t i v e  displacement type 
LINES 
The booster  pumps t r a n s f e r  t he  f u e l  from t h e  tanks t o  t h e i r  respec t ive  
engines through 1.5 inch outs ide  diameter, t h i n  w a l l ,  uninsulated s t a in -  
less s teel  tubing. 
A.4.2 LINE BREAK 
An engine pod torn  o f f  i n  a crash can cause f u e l  sp i l l age .  Assuming 
t h a t  t h e  f l i g h t  crew does not switch power o f f  t o  t h e  booster pump, i t  can 
de l ive r  about 2G pounds per second from a severed 1.5 inch l i n e .  I f  power 
is switched o f f  t o  the  booster  pumps, f u e l  can siphon from the  tanks a t  
rates depending upon f u e l  l eve l ,  a i r c r a f t  a l t i t u d e  and c losure  pos i t ion  
of t h e  tank shut  off  valve. 
A.4.3 FUEL TANK LEAK 
For crash landings i n  which the  wings are severed and/or t he  fuselage 
is damaged i n  t h e  wing-root area, it can be &ssumed t h a t  t h e  onboard f u e l  
is quickly released from containment. 
by a turb ine  blade released i n  an engine bu r s t  w i l l  dump f u e l  a t  a f i n i t e  
rate. 
3 lb l sec .  assuming a 2-foot s ta t ic  l i qu id  height .  
t he  f u e l  l o s s  rate is proport ional  t o  the  r a t i o  of flow areas. 
flow rates are summarized i n  Table 4.3 i n  Section 4. 
On the  o ther  hand, a tank punctured 
For example, a 1.5 inch diameter pumture  w i l l  releasL f u e l  a t  about 
For l a r g e r  punctures,  
These 
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APPENDIX B 
CALCULATION OF EQUILIBRIUM CONDITIONS 
for H,/AIR FLAMES - 
* Using the NASA Equilibrium computer code , we computed the temperature 
and water vapor concentration of the products of combustion for various 
concentrations of H2/air burninn at constant pressure. "he results are 
shown in Figure B.l for various levels of heat losses (as a fraction of 
thc heat liberated). Note that the heat loss does not affect the pre- 
dicted partial 
dicted temperature (T) . 
pressure of the water vapor (lBW) buf affects the pre- 
The horizontal dashed curves (T = 1700°K and Pw = 0.25 atm) Indicate 
the approximate average values anticipated in view of nonuniformities 
in the hydrogen concentration within the flame. 
is consistant with reported measurements. 
the radiation calculations for hydrogen flames. 
The temperature value 
These values were used in 
* 
NASA TN D-6586, 1972 
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APPENDIX C 
POOL FIRE DATA AND MODELS 
C.l INTRODUCTION 
kthis appendix, we present a review of the literature data and 
models pertinent to the characterization of pool fires. We focus on the 
burning rate, the pool diameter and the flame height. These three para- 
meters are needed to determine the radiation hazards of pool fires. 
First, we review of the experimental data on liquid pool boiling with 
and withdut combustion. These data are typically obtained for a con- 
stant pool diameter, fixed by the experimental setup. The Parameters 
of most concern here is the liquid recression rate which is determined 
by heat transfer from the flame or from the substrate material under the 
liquid. 
Secondly, we summarize the liquid spreading models utilized to 
determine the pool diameter of unconfined release on land. 
both the instantaneous and continuous releases, with and without combus- 
tion. 
We cover 
Finally, we review the correlations in the literature on flame height 
and sclect the most suitable for use in our study. 
C.2 EXPEHIMENTAL DATA ON POOL BOILING 
In a pool fire, the liquid boils due to heat transfer from either 
the flame or the ground (for cryogenic fuels) or both. 
compiled by many investigators for boiling with and without burning. 
These data are summarized in Table C.l for LHZ, LCH4 gasoline and 
kerosine. In each case, we describe briefly the experimental setup 
and give the volume of spilled liquid, the pool area, the substrate 
materials, the fuel, the liquid repression rate (with and without fire) 
and comments as appropriate. The substrate material is an important 
parameter since ita thermal properties affect the rate of heat transfer 
to cryogens. 
Data has been 
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The ranges of l i q u i d  regression da ta  of Table C.l are summarized i n  
Table C.2 f o r  LH2, LCH4, gasol ine and k.erosene. 
de t a i l ed  review of the  r e s u l t s  summarized i n  Table C . l  i nd ica t e  t h a t  
the governing mode of hea t  t r a n s f e r  t o  the  pool d i f f e r s  from frrel t o  f u e l .  
This is a l s o  summarized i n  Table C.2. 
These da t a  and our 
The most systematic  study of l i qu id  iipdrocarbon pool f i r e s  over the 
widest range of pool diameters was conducted by Blinov and Khudiakov 
(C.13). Gasoline, t r a c t o r  kerosene, d i e s e l  o i l ,  and s o l a r  o i l  (and, t o  
a l imi ted  ex ten t ,  household kerosene and transformer o i l )  were burned i n  
cy l ind r i ca l  pans (depth not ind ica ted)  of diameters 0.37 cm. t o  22.9 
meters. 
and photographic observations of the  flames were recorded. 
Liquid burning rates and flame he ights  were measured, and v i s u a l  
Hott-1 (c.14), p lo t t ed  the above da ta  i n  Figure C . l .  The lower 
curve of t h i s  f i gu re  gives  t h e  l i qu id  burning ve loc i ty  (y) as a function 
of pan diameter (D): while the upper curve gives  the  flame height  t o  Pan 
diameter r a t i o .  
numbers (Re,based.or, pan diameter and the  p rope r t i e s  of non-burning f u e l  vapor).  
It is of note  ‘.hat the  burning velocity-pan diameter r e l a t i o n  has the  
The diagonal l i n e s  are l i n e s  of constant  Reynolds 
same general  s t r u c t u r e  f o r  a l l  t he  fue ls .  
increasing pan diameter, with an almost constant  product of t h e  two. 
is t h e  laminar flow regime, with R e  less than about 20. 
i n  pan diameter t he  ve loc i ty  reaches a minimum; then i t  rises rap id ly  i n  
the  range of R e  from 20 t o  200; and f i n a l l y  i t  levels of f  again a t  a pan 
diameter about 1 meter o r  a Reynolds number about 500. Above t h a t  value 
the  burning is turbulent  and the  burning v e l o i i t y  is s u b s t a n t i a l l y  unin- 
fluenced by pan diameter o r  f u e l  type .  
It  f i r s t  decreases with 
This 
Wlth f u r t h e r  Increase 
Hot te l  demonstrated tha t  the  above behavior can be relatea LO t he  
heat  t r a n s f e r  rate (4) t h a t  determine the  rate of f u e l  vaporizat ion:  
;1/ nd2 - 4K(TF-TB) * H(TF-TB) + c Y F ( T ~ - T ~ ) ( ~ - ~ - ~ ~ )  4 4  - - 
4 d 
c.1 
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where t h e  left-hand s i d e  of t h e  equation represents  the mean he&t flue t o  
the  l i q u i d  pool from t h e  f i r e ;  t he  f i r s t  term on the  r i g h t  represents  
the conductive heat t r a n s f e r  rate through t h e  pan rim.: the  second term 
the  convective heat flux; and the  last  term t h e  r a d i a t i v e  t r a n s f e r  race. 
The mean hea i  f l u x  t o  the  pool divided by t h e  heat  of vaporizat ion of 
the l i q u i d  gives  t h e  l i q u i d  burning rate (3). 
Hot te l ' s  review i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  f o r  heavy hydrocarbon f u e l s  and a 
pool size g r e a t e r  than 1 m i n  diameter, t h e  r a d i a t i v e  hea t  t r a n s f e r  
term dominates eg. C . l .  Furthermore, t he  flame became o p t i c a l l y  thick.  
This is the regime of i n t e r e s t  t o  steady large-scale ,  turbulent  dir ' fusion 
radiation-dominated pool f i r e s .  
A similar study of pool f i r e s  was a l s o  conducted at the  Bureau of 
Mines (C.3) ,  although over a smaller range of diameters. S t i l l ,  they 
aeasured the  l imi t ing  value of t h e  burning rate f o r  a nmber  of l i q u i d  
f u e l s  and obtained the  following co r re l a t ion :  
11 
(cm/min) 
(C.2) 
where i is the  rate a t  which the l i qu id  pool l e v e l  decreases with 
time ( i n  the absence of e x t e r n a l  supply),  AHc and AHV are respect ively 
the lower heat of combustion and t h e  heat of vaporization of the  l i qu id  
f u e l  (see Figure C.2) .  
I n  a later publ icat ion (C.2), t he  Bureau of Mines mo3j.fied t h i s  
c o r r e l a t i o n  t o  include the  f u e l  l i qu id  densi ty  which v a r i e s  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  
between the  f u e l  studied. 
C.3 MODELS OF POOL SPREADING WITH EVAPORATION 
I n  t h i s  s ec t ion ,  w e  present the r e s u l t  of a modeling study of t h e  
spreading of cryogenic l i q u i d s  on land with and without heat  t r a n s f e r  
from a flame. 
Based on t h e  l i q u i d  release rate and i t R  dr;ration, he c l a s s i f i e d  the  s p i l l s  
as: (1) 'instantaneous release' i n  which $111 of t he  e p i l l  occurs i n  a 
"very s h o r t  time", and (2) t he  'continuous s p i l l '  i n  which the  s p i l l  
continues a t  a f i n i t e  rate f o r  a "long time". 
The ana lys i s  is based mainly on the work of Raj . (C. 15) 
The d i s t i n c t i o n  
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between short time and long time depends on a number of factors including 
the size af spill, the properties of the liquid and the env1rorrm;mtal 
conditions. 
He formulated a mathematical model based on conservation of mass, 
momentum and energy, and on the following assumptions: 
0 The heat transfer rate from land can be obtained from 
quasi one-dimensional heat conduction theory. 
The ?round is nerfectlv f l a t  and frictionless. 
0 Tlre diameter of the spill jet is small cumparad Lo the sire 
of spread of liquid. That is, the source is a point source 
on the ground. 
0 The thermal boundary laver in the ground grows laterally 
because of the liquid spread and depthwise because of 
t h e m 1  propagation. 
0 Thermal boundary layer profiles are self similar at all 
t imes . 
0 A flame provides a constant heat flux to the pool. 
He obtained expressions for the radius 3f spread, evaporation rate, 
and volume of liquid remaining as a function of time. 
the case of heat transfer from ground alcne and flame alone are 
summarized in Table C.3. Note that for cryogenic liquids, the pool 
radius increases continuously as the ground warns up. Thus, a steady 
pool may not be reached even for small continuous releases. The time 
dependence is weak, however, and a quasi-steady pool can be assumed. 
His results for 
These results were used to predict the pool diameters presented in 
Section 7 with the following items: 
1) For LCH4, gasoline and kerosene, we used the upper values of 
of the burning rate data In Teble C.2 to determine the heat transfer 
from flame to pool. 
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2) For L a 4  and LH we also accounted for heat transfer from ground * 2 
assuming a soil or concrete substrate. 
3)  
because the flame does not reach the optically thick limit within the 
fire sizes computed in this study. 
since the heat transfer from the flame determines the pool size which in 
turn affect the heat transfer. 
the LH2 pool size presented in Section 7. 
C.4 FLAME HEIGHT 
For LH2, the heat transfer from the flame is not constant 
This requires an iter. tive solution 
We iterated accordingly to determine 
Once the pool diameter and the liquid repression rate are determined 
as described in Section C.3,  the flame height can be calculated using 
correlations obtained in the literature. Thomas (C.16) has developed 
a correlation for the mean visible height of turbulent diffusion flames 
(in the absence of wind), based on experimental data of laboratory-scale 
wooden crib fires and dimensional analysis considerations. The correla- 
tion for a circular fire is: 
- H = 42 ( pa 
D c .  3 
where I& is the mass burning rate per unit pool area. 
The analysis of Thomas, based on which the above correlation has 
been developed, makes some fundamental assumptions. The flame is 
characterized by a single temperature and a specified gas camposition 
at the flame tip irrespective of the size or soot concentration in the 
flame. The correlation does not take into account either the differences 
in the fucl properties, or the differences in their flame radiation 
characteristics. In addition, Thomas indicates that the correlation is 
valid only if the turbulence is generated by the heat source itself, and 
not if ambient turbulence is convected into the fire plume. While it 
is true that Thomas has successfully correlated small, laboratory-size 
fire data, the validity of his correlation for large fires (D > 25 m) 
has never been tested. 
observed in the AGA tests (C.5).  Also shown is the above correlation. 
Figure C.3 shows the data on visible fire lengths 
* 0.5 1- - 1.4 kJ/m2 .OK.s 
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It is seen that the correlation generally underpredicts the height 
(by up to 50%) for large-diameter fires (larger than 6 m). 
The applicability of Thomas' correlation for higher hydrocarbon 
fuels is shown In Figure C.4. 
fires of diameters varying from 1 to 10 m (C.17). The correlation is 
obtained from eg. (C.3) with oh"- 0.05 k g / m  .s (or a linear regression 
rate of 4 mm/min). 
The measured values are for JP-4 pool 
2 
Steward (C.18) has also developed a slmilar correlation which is 
plotted in Figure C.3. 
correlation provides a better fit of the data than Steward's. 
it has been used throughout our calculations. 
As can be seen from the figure, Thomas' 
Accordingly, 
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FIGURE C . 4 :  RELATIVE FLAME HEIGHT (H/D) AS A 
POOL FIRES (C.17) 
FUNCTION OF FIRE WIm (D) FOR JP-.4 
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